

URBANIZATION IN MOTION: Forces of Displacement Crisis and the City (2014-2016)

2016


AUTHOR

Nadine Rachid

Nadine Rachid is a recent graduate in Design & Urban Ecologies from Parsons The New School for Design.

THE NEW SCHOOL

**GLOBAL URBAN
FUTURES**



URBANIZATION IN MOTION

FORCES OF
DISPLACEMENT
CRISIS
& THE CITY

URBANIZATION IN MOTION

Nadine Rachid
2014 - 2016

**MS DESIGN &
URBAN ECOLOGIES**
THE NEW SCHOOL

+1 646 249 5638
nadine.a.rachid@gmail.com

IN BRIEF

In 2010 during the UNFCCC's 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16), the international community officially accepted mobility as an informal adaptation mechanism to climate change, with the expectation that most of this movement will be directed towards cities. Cities across the world, such as Istanbul, Beirut, Amman, Berlin, and Dhaka, to name a few, have recently become ultimate destinations for local and cross-border mobility caused by environmental, economic and political upheaval. The popular image of war refugees and climate change migrants living in temporary settlements is no longer viable: 60% of the world's refugees and 80% of world's internally displaced people live in urban areas.

Therefore, through this research project I will argue that what the world is witnessing today is not only a short-term displacement challenge, rather a rapid urbanization process that occurs under dire socio-economic, political and environmental conditions. I will refer to this process of "displacement-to-urbanization" as Urbanization in Motion.

It is no surprise that forced displacement, and with that the process of Urbanization in Motion, is only expected to increase as the impact of climate change affect more people globally. As people flee their farmlands towns and cities due to climate change and other related events, people will seek new places in search for the continuity of their lives. The core of this project is not to find ways to stop this process through design, policy, or development projects; rather it is to imagine and design processes for cities to be able to absorb it.

The following proposal takes a critical look at the crisis narrative typically associated with forced displacement: situations that involve large scale and abrupt displacement are considered moments of crisis and consequently, tend to fall entirely under humanitarian aid mandates. However, the process of Urbanization in Motion, where people seek cities for refuge, is challenging the go-to mechanisms of humanitarian aid. Urbanization in Motion removes these "moments of crisis" from the controlled spaces of humanitarian aid, such as temporary camps and rural areas, and places them in dynamic urban settings, thus, changing the context around humanitarian aid approaches. With that, Urbanization in Motions blurs the lines between humanitarian needs and urban challenges and involves, directly and indirectly, new agencies, institutions, communities and actors. Despite this change in context, the approaches implemented by government agencies and aid organizations in urban settings tend to remain structured around the crisis lens: temporary, reactive and dependent on traditional crisis management mechanisms, which in most cases focus on individual needs rather than investing in building communities.

The aim of this project is to introduce a new lens through which aid organizations and government agencies view and approach the urban challenges that accompany the process of Urbanization in Motion. This lens, specific to the urban context, does not aim to provide "solutions" for "problems," rather, it reframes the narrative around these urban challenges in order to open up opportunities that go beyond traditional crisis management approaches, but rather explore possibilities for collaborations and partnerships among organizations, agencies and non-traditional actors involved in this complex process. Ultimately, this urban lens aims to shift the discourse around Urbanization in Motion from being limited to the crisis lens to become an urban narrative: dynamic, flexible and resilient. On that is rooted in rebuilding communities and supporting existing and emerging social entities in the city as a whole.

Urbanization in Motion is occurring as we speak in different places across the world, but these days it is mostly evident in the recent and ongoing conflict in Syria. The conflict has displaced millions of people internally and pushed others into cities in neighboring countries. Focusing on this crisis, the project explores how the process of Urbanization in Motion is manifesting in Istanbul, one of Syria's major neighboring cities currently hosting over 350,000 Syrian refugees. Based on fieldwork and analytical research, the project applies the urban lens to challenges identified in Istanbul in order to demonstrate a framework that brings forth spaces for productive collaborations and partnerships with multiple stakeholders

The urban lens is the beginning of an approach for the city dealing with moments of crisis. The lens uses the concept of the city as an active form that presents spaces for coexistence and co-production, in order to expose and connect an insurgent urban system that acts as social safety net in these moments of crisis.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1 **FROM CAMP
TO CITY**
- 2 **DEFINING
URBANIZATION
IN MOTION**
- 3 **THE FORCES OF
DISPLACEMENT**
- 4 **THE CRISIS
APPROACH**
- 5 **THE CITY WE
SEEK**
- 6 **THE URBAN
LENS**



FROM CAMP TO CITY

2



THE POPULAR IMAGE OF WAR REFUGEES & CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRANTS LIVING IN CAMPS IS NO LONGER VIABLE

FROM CAMP TO CITY

In the second half of 2014, hundreds of thousands of people made their way across the Mediterranean Sea seeking refuge in European countries. Thousands of people, many of whom were women and children, died as they risked their lives in the hopes for a better future. These events awakened the rest of the world to the levels of despair associated with forced displacement. Reports, articles and videos educated people about international law and the differences between a “refugee” and a “migrant.” Coastal cities in both Turkey and Greece that rarely made it to the news became destinations for foreign correspondents, aid workers and volunteers looking for a way to help.

A less obvious insight that the Syrian refugee crisis brought to light is that the future of forced displacement can no longer be contained to camps; instead, the future is in urban settings.¹ Knowing that the numbers of people forced to leave their homes is expected to dramatically increase with the impacts of climate change, the reality of the critical interconnection between forced displacement and the future of cities becomes more evident.

The common perception about refugees is that they predominantly live in refugee camps. The reality, in fact is different. In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis for example. In Jordan, almost 80% of the refugees live in urban areas not in camps. In fact, the Zaatari camp, which has been a symbol for portraying the gravity of the refugee crisis since 2012, only hosts 20% of the refugees in Jordan.² The story is repeated in Turkey as well. At the time of writing, the Turkish government had set up 23 refugee camps on its borders with Syria. Out of the estimated 2 million refugees in Turkey 85% live in urban areas,³ despite the fact the conditions in the Turkish refugee camps⁴ are considered to be in a “foremost position” when compared to other camps in the region.⁵ David Miliband, the president and CEO of International Rescue Committee, wrote in an article for the Guardian in October 2015 clarifying that refugees in Jordan do not “flee to urban areas because camps are full: Azraq camp in the Jordanian desert has plenty of vacancies. Only 14,000 places were filled by the end of 2014, when it has capacity for 60,000. Thousands of refugees who have been sent to Jordanian camps have left as quickly as they can – legally or illegally – preferring to fend for themselves in an urban environment rather than live in isolation and dependence.”⁶ In Turkey, despite the fact that the refugees “have good conditions in the camps and their basic needs are met, the majority of the refugees choose to live outside of camps.”⁷ The reasons are similar to the ones in Jordan: limited options for economic growth and personal freedom.⁸

Refugees have little opportunities to make choices: they had no choice when they were forced to leave their homes, they are stripped from all agency about the future of their lives, and most of the options they have are governed and controlled by national and international policies and laws. However, it is becoming apparent that refugees prefer to live outside of refugees camps and seek that option when available legally and even illegally at times, depending on the policies of the countries that are hosting them.

The quest for refuge in the city is not unique to the Syrian refugee crisis; the fact is, almost 60% of the world’s 20 million refugees live in urban areas. These numbers do not include the millions of people who are displaced internally and therefore are not considered refugees. There are almost 38 million people who are displaced in their own countries due to conflict or extreme

1 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) Secretariat in collaboration with UN-Habitat. (n.d.). City Haven: People on the Move/ Harboring the Displaced.

2 Syrian refugees Living Outside Camps in Jordan (Home Visit Data Findings, 2013, Rep.). (2013). Jordan: UNHCR.

3 Effects of Syrian Refugees on Turkey (Rep. No. 129). (2015). Orsam.

4 The Turkish government built and manages that refugee camps in Turkey, unlike other countries where The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is responsible for building and managing camps. In Turkey, the role of UNHCR in the camps is advisory.

5 The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighboring Countries: Finding Conclusions and Recommendations. (Rep. No. 189). (2014). Orsam.

6 Miliband, D. (2015). David Miliband | Cities are where the Syrian refugee crisis is at its worst. Retrieved May 2, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/oct/30/cities-are-at-the-centre-of-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-so-why-are-they-being-ignored>

7 Orsam Report (2014)

8 Orsam Report (2014)



**60% OF
REFUGEES
LIVE IN
CITIES**



2013 PHILIPPINES



2005 USA



2009 PAKISTAN



2014 INDIA

200 MILLION TO 1 BILLION CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT BY 2050



2009 SYRIA



2013 BRAZIL



2014 JORDAN



2011 - 2014 USA



2009 IRAQ

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OFFICIALLY ACCEPTED MOBILITY AS AN INFORMAL ADAPTATION MECHANISM TO CLIMATE CHANGE

weather events, 80% of them live in urban areas.⁹

Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent with climate change, causing both temporary and long-term displacement in addition to large losses of human lives and property. According to The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, in 2014 alone almost 17.5 million people have been displaced due to extreme weather events, mainly storms and floods. The largest numbers of displacement were in the Philippines, India and China.¹⁰ Future estimates of climate change displacement are even bleaker. The Estimates vary between 200 million people displaced by 2050, as estimated by Professor Norman Myers from Oxford University, to almost one billion as estimated by Christian Aid, a number that includes an additional 645 million people that are likely to be displaced due to the construction of dams and other development projects.¹¹ "Climate change-induced displacement is likely to present new and great challenges. The impact and consequences of permanent, non-reversible displacement caused by climate change and rising sea levels, has yet to be fully grasped by governments and its peoples."¹²

Refugees and climate change migrants are not the same: they do not flee the same type of violence, they do not have the same legal standing and they do not have the same level of access to aid. The point here is not to scrutinize the terms or argue for or against the different categorization of the different groups of forced displacement. There has been ample literature by both migration and refugee disciplines that make these arguments extremely well. However, the point here is about taking the conversation away from these categories and closer to the destination that all these groups seek. As different as these groups of people are, they have a common grounds: all of them have been violently forced to leave their home, their social, economic, political and even physical systems that they belonged to and participated in, they all seek options for the continuity of their lives and they all want some sort normalcy.

9 Habitat III Issue Papers 2 - Migration and Refugees in Urban Areas. (2015, June 3). Retrieved March, 2016, from http://www.europeanhabitat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2-Migration-and-Refugees-in-Urban-Areas_rus.pdf

10 International Displacement Monitoring Center: Global figures. (2015, May). Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>

11 Herson, M., & Hayatli, M. (2008). Forced Migration Refugee: Climate Change and Displacement (p. 8, Rep. No. 31) (M. Couldrey, Ed.). Refugee Studies Center.

12 Herson, M., & Hayatli, M. (2008).

Forced displacement is happening as we speak in different parts of the world and at different levels. However, as governments, communities and aid organizations are figuring out what to do about the situations at hand, people are fending for themselves seeking options that suit their need whether legally, illegally or even dangerously. As the numbers above point out, these options are leading towards cities.

"Over the past 40 years, the urban population in lower-income and fragile countries has increased by 326 percent."¹³ Refugees and migrants who seek refuge in cities remain vulnerable and sometime illegal and more than often live in low-income neighborhoods and makeshift settlements.¹⁴ The people involved become part of the urban fabric of the new city in which they live, they access the informal and formal markets, share the housing markets and depending on their legal status and the cities they live in may have access to healthcare and education. This process of forced displacement is leading to rapid and unplanned population growth in cities;¹⁵ it resembles the process of urbanization rather than temporary displacement. This process is unique to the events that lead to it and therefore it should be considered as a "new" form urbanization, I will refer to it as Urbanization in Motion.

What is Urbanization in Motion? And, how can cities plan for it?


13 Earle, L. (n.d.). Urban Crises and the New Urban Agenda (p. 3, Working paper). Environment & Urbanization - International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

14 The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighboring Countries: Finding Conclusions and Recommendations. (Rep. No. 189). (2014). Orsam.

Herson, M., & Hayatli, M. (2008). Forced Migration Refugee: Climate Change and Displacement (Rep. No. 31) (M. Couldrey, Ed.). Refugee Studies Center.

15 Cities such as: Beirut, Amman, Dhaka

DEFINING URBANIZATION IN MOTION



AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK

The most common understanding of the process of urbanization refers to the population growth of urban areas, where these areas are determined according to their “population size, population density, type of economic activity, physical characteristics, level of infrastructure, or a combination of these or other criteria.”¹ However, Urbanization in Motion does not fall under this mainstream definition of the “urban” or urbanization. Urbanization in Motion is a process that is closer to Neil Brenner’s definition of “Planetary Urbanization” which as defined by Brenner and Christian Schmid means “that even spaces that lie well beyond the traditional city cores and suburban peripheries—from transoceanic shipping lanes, transcontinental highway and railway networks, and worldwide communications infrastructures to alpine and coastal tourist enclaves, “nature” parks, offshore financial centers, agro-industrial catchment zones and erstwhile “natural” spaces such as the world’s oceans, deserts, jungles, mountain ranges, tundra, and atmosphere—have become integral parts of the worldwide urban fabric. While the process of agglomeration remains essential to the production of this new worldwide topography, political-economic spaces can no longer be treated as if they were composed of discrete, distinct, and universal “types” of settlement.”² Planetary Urbanization refers to the urban as a “structural product of social practices and political strategies”³ that is “premised on, and in turn contributes to, wide-ranging sociospatial organization and ecological/ environmental conditions across the rest of the world.”⁴

Urbanization in Motion is a process that is the result of a “web” of events that occur prior to the initial displacement of people and that are connected to larger social, economic, political and environmental forces, that in turn are intertwined and go beyond the limits of the city or even the country. The destination of this form of displacement is not the city as the unit measurable by density and area and that sits in contradiction to the “rural.” Rather, it is the city as the urban process as defined above by Brenner “the dense concentration of population, infrastructure, and investment in one location.”⁵ Therefore, as we proceed to further unpack this process of urbanization, it is important to keep in mind this definition rather than the predominant understanding of both terms “urbanization” and the “city.”

Based on the above understanding of the planetary effects of social and political events, the following project highlights the critical interconnection between the future of cities - as urban processes - and the impacts of climate change on displacement patterns. Urbanization in Motion as a process that combines three thematic, usually identified and addressed independently: forced displacement, the crisis narrative and the city. This intersection brings the complexities of each thematic into this process of urbanization, further emphasizing that it is a larger process that goes beyond the understanding of categorized forms of displacement.

To begin with, I would like to clarify that I intentionally refer to the forced displacement and the crisis narrative as separate thematic. Even though forced displacement is usually associated with the crisis narrative, the intention here is to critically look at this coupling, especially as it intersects with the city. The aim is to look at how these thematic impact the lives and decisions of the people involved in the process.

The process of forced displacement does not only uproot people from their homes, it removes them from the systems they belong to, whether they are social, physical, political or economic. People who have been displaced go through the psychological trauma similar to “root shock,” a concept that Mindy Fullilove adapts from gardening to explain the impacts of the displacement of African American communities in the United States during urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s. “Root shock is the traumatic stress reaction to the loss of some or all of one’s emotional ecosystem.”⁶ The concept of root shock helps in providing a broader image to the level of loss that people who undergo forced displacement experience going beyond basic needs to encompass one’s entire ecosystem.

1 Refer to the World Bank’s urbanization criteria

2 Brenner, N., & Schmid, C. (n.d.). Planetary Urbanization (M. Gandy, Ed.). Urban Constellations, 10-11.

3 Brenner, N. (2015). Thesis on Urbanization. Duke University Press, 25(1), 109. doi:10.1215/08992363-1890477

4 Brenner, N. (2015).

5 Brenner, N. (2015).

6 Fullilove, M. (n.d.). Root Shock. Retrieved May, 2016, from <http://www.rootshock.org/>

How do you rebuild an ecosystem? Or, how do you find an alternative?

History has proved to us that the answer is not in building temporary solutions, usually represented in temporary settlements of refugee camps. The crisis narrative immediately brings with it the modus operandi of control, management and the top-down approach of “experts” arriving to a site to provide a quick solution. This immediate approach is essential in crisis management and humanitarian aid. It is a reliable method that is effective in alleviating the impacts of a situation that disrupts millions of lives and results in human and financial losses. However, the problem with the crisis narrative, is when it when applied over the span of multiple years, as is most cases that involve situations of mass displacement, it becomes an obstacle in the way of people’s progress and continuity.⁷

Even though the aid approach is essential in providing immediate support, the causes that lead to forced displacement tend to last for multiple years and therefore rendering what is meant to be temporary assistance, a long-term way of life. This complicates the lives and identities of refugees, migrants and other groups of displaced people. According to Michel Agier, much of the complications and limitations people who have been forcibly displaced face are due to these temporary approaches that are interweaved with refugee policies and border controls. His breakdown of the implications of displacement, humanitarian aid and restrictive policies on the bodies of the people involved is essential for understanding the restrictions they face in the new cities they seek.⁸

In addition to being separated from support systems and emotional ecosystems, Hannah Arendt points out to the one’s political identity, which goes deeper and is harder to rebuild given that it is dependent on political systems and international and local policies. Arendt refers to this loss as “public invisibility”⁹ that comes with the condition of “statelessness,” a notion that Agier also builds on when he refers to the “citizenless.” This notion occurs when people lose their “rights to rights,” or to practice their citizenship with displacement. I do not associate the loss of the political identity as an effect of forced displacement since it a result of restrictive policy and political decision. This loss I believe, sits perfectly between the crisis narrative and the city. Again, going back to Agier, the visible and invisible borders¹⁰ built around the citizenless are a result of collaboration between the humanitarian aid approaches that adheres to the restrictive policies of nation states, usually in the global north. Thus, the continuous struggle of the citizenless is, intentionally or not intentionally, supported by the systems that are put into place to support them.

Finally, the city here is a space that presents possibilities for social production, political agency and economic interactions, where social networks act as safety nets and navigating tool, and where means of economic production, physical infrastructures and services are centralized. It is the space that Hannah Arendt refers to as “spaces of interactions”¹¹ “where [she] appear[s] to others as they appear to [her],” as people perform actions and share arguments and opinions. The “spaces of interactions” are where one’s public visibility, which allows for political and public participation, or in other words political identity, and is balanced with his/her natural invisibility, which is the space for private affairs related to natural needs of protection, safety and shelter, a space for family and caring for children.¹² With this understanding I refer to the city here as the space for people to communicate, negotiate and disagree in a process that makes them “political

7 Earle, L. (n.d.). Urban Crises and the New Urban Agenda (p. 3, Working paper). Environment & Urbanization - International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

8 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

9 Borren, M. (2010). Amor mundi: Hannah Arendt’s political phenomenology of world (Ch. 6: Public visibility and private invisibility). University of Amsterdam. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.325974>

10 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

11 Borren, M. (2010).

12 Borren, M. (2010).

humanitarian aid and restrictive policies on the bodies of the people involved is essential for understanding the restrictions they face in the new cities they seek.¹


In addition to being separated from support systems and emotional ecosystems, Hannah Arendt points out to the one's political identity, which goes deeper and is harder to rebuild given that it is dependent on political systems and international and local policies. Arendt refers to this loss as "public invisibility"² that comes with the condition of "statelessness," a notion that Agier also builds on when he refers to the "citizenless." This notion occurs when people lose their "rights to rights," or to practice their citizenship with displacement. I do not associate the loss of the political identity as an effect of forced displacement since it a result of restrictive policy and political decision. This loss I believe,

1 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). *Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
 2 Borren, M. (2010). *Amor mundi: Hannah Arendt's political phenomenology of world* (Ch. 6: Public visibility and private invisibility). University of Amsterdam. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.325974>

sits perfectly between the crisis narrative and the city. Again, going back to Agier, the visible and invisible borders³ built around the citizenless are a result of collaboration between the humanitarian aid approaches that adheres to the restrictive policies of nation states, usually in the global north. Thus, the continuous struggle of the citizenless is, intentionally or not intentionally, supported by the systems that are put into place to support them.

Finally, the city here is a space that presents possibilities for social production, political agency and economic interactions, where social networks act as safety nets and navigating tool, and where means of economic production, physical infrastructures and services are centralized. It is the space that Hannah Arendt refers to as "spaces of interactions"⁴ "where [she] appear[s] to others as they appear to [her]," as people perform actions and share arguments and opinions. The "spaces of interactions" are where one's public visibility, which allows

3 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). *Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
 4 Borren, M. (2010).



for political and public participation, or in other words political identity, and is balanced with his/her natural invisibility, which is the space for private affairs related to natural needs of protection, safety and shelter, a space for family and caring for children.⁵ With this understanding I refer to the city here as the space for people to communicate, negotiate and disagree in a process that makes them “political animals” as J. B. Jackson puts it.⁶ Or as AbdouMaliq Simone put it, “a space of networks and connections.”⁷

But the city is still a territory, in the sense that that combines both space and legal regulatory systems. Jean Gottman defines territory as “a portion of geographical space, that is, concrete space accessible to human activities... Territory is the fruit of partitioning and of organization.” Therefore, that city is a space of interactions and networks, governed by an “organization” the limits and controls the accessibility of different “categories” of people to the predefined jurisdiction of the city. Here is where the intersection of the crisis narrative and forced displacement with the city become complicated and problematic for the people going through displacement. The people who seek the city as a refuge are rejecting the predetermined rules that control the destination of people who have been forcibly displaced. In the city, they are seeking the space of interactions that provides the social, physical, emotional, economic and political systems that they lost. However, when they arrive to the city and despite the fact they are present in the public sphere they remain marginalized, living “on margins of social, political juridical and biological representations.”⁸ The refugees or migrants in the city remain in what Giorgio Agamben refers to as the “state of exception,” where they are “set apart from others by law.” In order to address the challenges that come to the city with the process of Urbanization in Motion and the impacts that the process has on both the local

.....
5 Borren, M. (2010).

6 Jackson, J. B. (1984). *Discovering the Vernacular Landscape*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. A pair of Ideal Landscapes

7 Simone, A. M. (2004). *For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities*. Durham: Duke University Press.

8 Anthony Downey (2009) Zones of Indistinction: Giorgio Agamben's 'Bare

Life' and the Politics of Aesthetics, *Third Text*, 23:2, 109-125, DOI: 10.1080/09528820902840581

and displaced communities, we need to overlay the complexities that the above three thematic bring. When working in cities, we are working in complex and interconnected systems that go beyond the jurisdictional boundary of the territory; therefore, the strategies that we devise should be suitable for complex structures. The theory of complexity tells us that “*because complex systems are open systems, we need to understand the system’s complete environment before we can understand the system, and, of course, the environment is complex in itself. There is no human way of doing this*” (Cilliers 2005:258).⁹ Therefore, in an effort to address the challenges of urbanization in motion on the people displaced, the local community and the city as system, I apply of systems thinking, or more accurately “ecological thinking” that addresses the relations between systems and people, how they “relate” and “what happens when relations are served,” looking at positive and negative effects of these interaction.¹⁰ With that as a base, the Urban Lens is built on a thinking process that takes into account these connections and works on highlighting the impacts of these networks on each other. The Urban Lens thus, acts a tool to unpack the complexity of this interconnection, by looking at the agencies, institutions and interests involved in the Urbanization in Motion process through the “macro,” “meso” and “micro” levels of social organization¹¹ and highlight relations, power dynamics and opportunities for collaborations and partnerships.

.....
9 Bergström, J., and S. W. A. Dekker. 2014. Bridging the Macro and the Micro by Considering the Meso: Reflections on the Fractal Nature of Resilience. *Ecology and Society* 19(4): 22. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06956-190422>

10 In Cohen, J. J. (2014). *Prismatic Ecology: Ecotheory Beyond Green*. Bryant L. R. Black. p.296

11 Applying Sociology Within Various Society Levels. (n.d.). Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://www.appliedsoc.org/society/>

URBANIZING IN ISTANBUL

I met Ibrahim, Ali and two other men both called Mahmoud in a small Syrian restaurant in the heart of Istanbul. Ali and one of the Mahmonds sat around a table stacked with plates of grilled chicken, garlic paste, pickled cucumbers and Arabic flat-bread soaked in a spice paste. Ibrahim offered me a cup of tea while the other Mahmoud ran the cashier. The young men chatted quietly as they listened to my phone interview with the owner of the restaurant. "Come eat with us," Ali said when I interrupted their meal to ask about their life in Istanbul.

The restaurant is located in Aksaray, a neighborhood in the heart of the Fatih district in city center. The four friends, three of whom work at the restaurant, are Syrian refugees who fled to Istanbul from Tadmur, a city in central Syria now under the control of the ISIS or ISUL. Six months before I met the young men, Ibrahim and the two Mahmonds were getting smuggled across the Syrian borders with Turkey, and together traveled north to Istanbul. Once in the city, they got connected with Ali, at the time a distant acquaintance from their hometown. Ali had made a similar journey almost a year prior to his now close friends. Today, he speaks Turkish and is a freelance tour guide.

The young men are only four out of over 350,000 Syrian refugees who made similar, or even more complicated journeys to Istanbul. This number is a fraction of the two and a half million refugees scattered across other Turkey. In fact, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan house almost 3.5 million Syrian refugees between camps, cities, suburbs and villages.


Since its start in 2011, the conflict in Syria has internally and internationally displaced almost half of the country's population. People were forced to leave their towns, cities and the country due to direct threat to their lives and the different levels of destruction caused by the war. The war in Syria killed almost 270,000 people since 2011. It has also led to the debilitation of the country through the destruction of physical, economic and social infrastructures, and the uprooting of social ties through displacement or, more directly, death. The combination of these factors and more, have forced people to leave their country and land in search for functioning systems to be part of, where their lives can be resumed.

With an economic loss of over 200 billion dollars, the absence of working education and healthcare systems and the lack of basic services, the status quo was suspended and the quest for a system that allowed for life to be sustained became inevitable. This has led to what is now considered the "biggest humanitarian emergency of our time, and one of the largest refugee crises in history." Since the beginning of the crisis, humanitarian aid organizations and government agencies in neighboring countries began to construct and manage temporary refugee camps to house people fleeing Syria and provide them with basic needs. However, although the common perception is that the majority of the refugees are living in these camps, in reality that is not the case. In fact, 80% of the Syrian refugees are seeking support to thrive in urban areas not camps. And this is not limited to the Syrian crisis, 60% of the world's 60 million forcibly displaced people also live in urban settings.

"The camp is for people who lost everything. People in camps are slowly waiting to die," Mahmoud said from across the table. The men explained that the city is a challenging place for refugees, but it offers hope for economic growth and social progress despite all the obstacles that their temporary legal status imposes on them. Most of the time, their limited incomes are barely enough to pay for rent, transport and food for the month, but they have learned new skills and languages in order to participate in the production and service sectors of the city. That alone presents a hopeful possibility for a better future, one that is not as attainable in refugee camps.

"I am waiting for the weather to get better to go to Europe," Ibrahim said, "Germany." Getting smuggled across the Mediterranean Sea to European cities presented a future of safety, progress, and inclusion, basically hope for the continuation of his life. Ibrahim told me that his brother was already resettled in Germany. With that, he spoke about the availability of services, access to physical, social and economic infrastructures, and the prospect of becoming a permanent resident where he can live and work legally.

For anyone looking from a distance, the case of the current refugee crisis is a story about forced



displacement, violence, war and the instability of the Middle East trickling to the European borders and other countries. From a humanitarian perspective, the story presents the unfamiliar conditions of operating within cities and adapting to the additional challenges the urban sphere introduces to a humanitarian crisis as grand as this one. However, at the level of the city where the social and economic interactions take place, it presents a quest for the continuation of life that goes beyond the saving of lives.

The refugee crisis sheds light on the importance of cities in the process of displacement and settlement. As the stories and images of large numbers of people heading to European borders began to emerge on media outlets, it became apparent that this journey to the city is not limited to the Syrian refugees fleeing war. The key driver behind people fleeing to cities is the quest for the continuation of life.

The forces that lead to mass displacement can be summed up into three categories: displacement caused by war, political unrest and authoritative regimes, displacement caused by harsh economic conditions or economic degradation and displacement caused by extreme environmental events and climate change. These forces do not exist entirely independently from each other; each one when taken alone rarely results in mass displacement. However, it is the interplay of two or more of these conditions that drive people to lose hope in the status quo and thus are forced to leave their homes. So, whether people are fleeing violence, poverty, droughts, floods or rising sea level, they are looking for spaces of safety and opportunities for economic and social growth; in other words, they are seeking cities.

The examples are ample, however, the causes of displacement are diverse. The recent migrant crisis to Europe shows that the quest for the continuation of life goes beyond war. The groups of people risking their lives to make it to cities included multiple nationalities fleeing a combination of the above forces. In addition to Syrians the groups included people from Afghanistan, a country struggling with both internal conflict and poverty, Eritrea where “dismal human rights situation, exacerbated by indefinite military conscription, has led thousands of Eritreans to flee every month,” and Sudan where people are fleeing either camps or other cities to which they had been already displaced, to name a few.

The fact that cities are becoming the destination for people who are being forcibly displaced by one or a combination of the political economic or environmental forces, means that these types of crises have crossed the boundaries of being solely humanitarian aid “problems” to become development challenges as well. This also means that the conventional tools and mechanisms that have been put into place by aid organizations to deal with these crisis situations are being challenged and need to be re-imagined. The list continues to include the conversations around sustainable development. The promises that the international community has agreed to through the Sustainable Development Goals should include a section about the importance of cities in this process of displacement and settlement.

The stories of four young men are not only stories of refugees; they are the experiences of societies on the move. The refugee status is merely a legal standing given to them as a result of the type of force that led to their displacement. Needless to say, this status comes with its own set of limitations and benefits, however I will explore those further when I address the details and different legal levels of forced displacement. The key point regarding the stories of these men and many others who have been forcibly displaced, is that despite the fact that their displacement was out of their control, their choice to come to Istanbul and other cities was intentional and calculated regardless of the life threatening risks it involved.




CRISIS: STATE OF EXCEPTION

Predominantly utilizes mechanisms designed for controlled spaces such as temporary camps & rural areas.

Faces operational challenges within the urban sphere.

Operates in silos.



The process of Urbanization in Motion is presenting the world with a new context for forced displacement in terms of scale and destination. This project argues that with this shift in context, we need a shift in the paradigm of humanitarian aid responses within the urban sphere. The project uses research and design strategies to identify gaps between institutions, agencies and civil society in order to present an alternate perspective and approach to the predominant "crisis" narrative.

URBAN: SPACE OF INTERACTION

Situates displacement-to-cities as an urbanization process

Links the narrative about cities to development

Provides a research process to engage with non-traditional actors

Provides a framework for multi-stakeholder approach



The following pages will present an analytical and critical look at the three main components of the process of Urbanization in Motion: forces of displacement, the crisis approach, and the city as refuge. Finally, the paper will propose a process to instigate a shift in the discourse around displacement-to-cities from being focused on "crisis in the city" to becoming one that views this context as a "city in crisis," and with that, steer away from the traditional reactive and crisis management approaches, towards dynamic strategies, rooted in rebuilding social infrastructure and supporting existing and emerging social entities.

THE FORCES OF DISPLACEMENT


WHAT IS FORCED DISPLACEMENT?

Since Urbanization in Motion is the process where people who are forcibly displaced moving into urban conditions locally or in neighboring countries, we need to first understand what forced displacement is. I will adopt the definition given by International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) that defines it as: “ a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.”¹

For a migration process to be considered Urbanization in Motion it must fulfill three loosely framed criteria: first, the events that lead to displacement must be due to external uncontrollable forces such as environmental, economic and/or political degradation; second, a migration process will be considered an Urbanization in Motion when the endeavor does not occur under the immigration or resettlement to third-country process through official channels such as The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) or country ministries; finally, the destination of this form of migration must be to the urban (as defined above). These three criteria make this process of Urbanization in Motion specific to situations that involve mass displacement of people. However, in order to understand the limitation, advantages and disadvantages of each criterion I will expand on them below, in addition to providing a general overview of terms and definitions that are generally used by mainstream media and the organization and agencies involved in these situations.

As I elaborate on the criteria below, I will clarify the differences between the different groups of forced displacement and refer to insights and examples that I have collected through research and fieldwork conducted in Istanbul in January of 2016.

¹ What is forced migration? (n.d.). Retrieved May, 2016, from <http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm>
Forced Migration Online (FMO)



THE FORCES

I will start here by introducing the word “forces” when referring to what could be understood as the causes of forced displacement. This distinction between these words is very important, although it may appear subtle. The word “cause” conceals important specificity that is needed in understanding the process of forced displacement. I use the word “force,” because I do not believe that there is always an immediate and traceable cause-and-effect correlation between these forces and displacement. Instead, as I will expand on below, the effects of these forces are in at times disguised, indirect or compounded with other events that eventually lead to displacement. Also, the word “force” suggests the violence and overbearing power that the events leading to displacement have over the people involved. Finally, the word “force” implies that it is applied by an external actor, and insinuates that the events at hand are connected to external and larger ones that go beyond the limits and borders of a given sites.

The forces that lead to mass displacement can be summed up into three categories: displacement caused by extreme environmental events and climate change, displacement caused by war, political unrest and authoritative regimes, and displacement caused by harsh economic conditions or economic degradation.

These forces are often looked at and referred to as separate events that produce separate groups of “victims,” which in turn are legally regarded differently. People who are displaced by wars and political unrest are often considered refugees; people displaced by economic degradation are referred to as migrants or economic migrants, as for the people who have been displaced by climate change and extreme weather events, they are sometimes referred to as environmental refugees or climate change migrants or forced migrants.

Legally there is no one universally accepted term that encompasses all groups of people who are forcibly displaced. Instead, people are divided into categories depending on which force led to their displacement. The only category that holds any legal standing is that of the refugee. “A refugee, according to the [1951 Geneva] Convention, is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”¹ In practice, this typically applies to people fleeing wars, violent conflicts and persecution. However, there are several other groups of people who are fleeing life-threatening conditions but are not legally protected.

A refugee is a legal status that one can claim if he or she fits the definition set by the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention. A refugee is protected by international law and has access to assistance provided by the host countries or international aid organizations led by The Un Refugee Agency. It is by law that refugees cannot be sent back to their country of origin. However, this is only applicable as long as the country of origin is still considered unsafe for the person to return to it. Therefore, if the country is deemed safe (even if the person’s property no longer exists) the person’s refugee status can be revoked and the person can be deported or become an illegal resident.² In the recent Syrian refugee crisis, another layer of this legal status emerged. Turkey, for example, hosting over 2.5 million refugees since 2011, has signed the 1951 convention with “geographic limitation.” Basically, Turkey assumes responsibility for the resettlement and inclusion of refugees from countries that belong to the “Council of Europe,” now the European Union. Refugees from all other countries are granted a “Temporary Asylum” status and must find alternative long-term solutions. This means that refugees from countries other than the EU cannot be resettled in Turkey and cannot be considered towards citizenship.³

Which brings me to a subgroup of refugees: asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are people that are already outside their country of origin when the conditions of the country change, and are granted refugee status. They go through a lengthy application process with UNHCR and host countries,

¹ Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. (n.d.). Retrieved May, 2016, from <http://www.unhcr.org/3b-66c2aa10.html>
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
² The 1951 Refugee Convention. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html>
³ Refugee Solidarity Network. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://www.refugeesolidaritynetwork.org/syrians-in-turkey/>

which if approved, can lead to citizenship and relocation to a third-country.⁴ Everyone who holds a refugee status has the right to apply for asylum keeping in mind that being a refugee does not guarantee being approved for asylum. However, different countries have different regulations for granting asylum, which in many cases are very restrictive. For example, the United States, at the time of writing, was only accepting a small number of refugees with a condition that they must have family connections in the US.⁵ Another example is what is known as the European Dublin Regulation which states that regulation of asylum seekers to the EU territory will be regulated “predominantly on the basis of family links followed by responsibility assigned on the basis of the State through which the asylum seeker first entered, or the State responsible for their entry into the territory of the EU Member States.”⁶ This regulation proved to be problematic when the Syrian refugee crisis reached Europe. Due to its geographic location, Greece, currently struggling economically, received the majority of the migrants and asylum seekers and was not able to regulate, host or process asylum application effectively.

The second group of people who are forcibly displaced are migrants, a term which economic migrants. Migrants have a very different story from refugees. Migrants are considered to have made a conscious decision about leaving their country. They are not considered to be under life threatening danger and therefore, should be able to return at any point in time to their home without fear to their wellbeing. This means that they are not protected by international law.⁷ Migrants, if not granted proper paperwork will be considered illegal and risk deportation.

Michel Agier, an ethnologist and anthropologist who focuses on forced displacement, critically refers to this process of categorizing the displaced as a process of “management” and logistics.⁸ This process “classifies and sorts” people into groups with the aim of controlling their circulation

4 Action Alerts. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://www.refugees.org/about-us/faqs.html>

5 Bonar, Emma, phone interview with Youth Project Manager at the Norwegian Refugee Council, November, 2014.

6 Dublin Regulation - European Council on Refugees and Exiles. (n.d.). Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/10-dublin-regulation.html>

7 Action Alerts. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://www.refugees.org/about-us/faqs.html>

8 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). *Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

The map below shows the displacement caused by environmental events including events caused by climate change across the world in 2014.



Data From International Displacement Monitoring Center 2015
Map Generated With Cartodb By Nadine Rachid

and access to different territories, whether those are nation-states, cities or even temporary settlements that are specifically created for the displaced.⁹ With that, people become deprived of their right to practice their rights and placed in a temporary category that offers to realistic time frame. Although the time frame for people displaced due to environmental and economic conditions is not accurately monitored as that of the refugees, we are able to grasp the scale of the displacement challenge from the recent statistics that show that the average displacement time of refugees “has increased from nine years in 1993 to 17 years at the end of 2003.”¹⁰

Although in legal terms these forces produce different groups of displaced people, it is important to remember that the forces do not exist in voids where they are independent from each other. Each one of the forces, maybe with the exception of war, when taken alone rarely results in mass displacement. However, it is the interplay of two or more of these conditions that force people to lose hope in the status quo and thus are forced to leave their homes.

Between 2006 and 2009, the region historically known as the Fertile Crescent, went through a devastating drought that affected farmlands in both northern Syria and Iraq. This has directly impacted the livelihoods of many, who were already marginalized by the authoritative regime. Three years later, a social uprising started in the northern cities and towns of Syria, where people took to the streets after the “arrest and torture of some teenagers who painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall.”¹¹ What does the drought have to do with the authoritative regime one might ask. A study published in early 2015 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, linked the uprising of the Syrian people that started in northern Syria and consequently lead to the civil war to the drought and climate change effects.¹² The study does not jump to the claim that climate change led to the war in Syria and this would be a too simplistic approach.

9 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011).


10 Chapter 5: Protracted refugee situations: The search for practical solutions. (UNHCR, 2007). *The State of the World's Refugees 2006*, ATCR Agenda, 4a, 105-197. Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://www.unhcr.org/4444afcb0.pdf>

11 Rodgers, L., Gritten, D., Offer, J., & Asare, P. (2016, March 11). Syria: The story of the conflict - BBC News. Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>

12 Fountain, H. (2015, March 02). Researchers Link Syrian Conflict to a Drought Made Worse by Climate Change. Retrieved February, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/science/earth/study-links-syria-conflict-to-drought-caused-by-climate-change.html?_r=0

In 2014 over 60 million people were displaced due to conflict & environmental events

The map below shows the displacement caused by both environmental events including events caused by climate change & conflict across the world in 2014.



Data From International Displacement Monitoring Center 2015
Map Generated With Cartodb By Nadine Rachid



“CATASTROPHIC CONVERGENCE”



“COLLISION OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS”



However, the report highlights the fact that the forces that lead to forced displacement are not always as simple as they are portrayed. The war in Syria led to the displacement of over half the population in the country. Yes, this is a correct statement. But, the war in Syria is connected to multiple other factors such as decades of an authoritative regime, a drought that lasted for at least three years, not to forget the American invasion of Iraq that sent 2 million people fleeing into Syria.

In Kenya, climate change has altered the patterns of annual rainfall. Although, the country might be receiving more rain on average, the fact that the rainfall is sporadic is leading to floods followed by droughts. This is also affecting the livelihood habits of the Kenyans living in these areas who rely on grazing animals. Competition over territory and animals between Kenyan tribes has led violent conflict between them.¹³

Similarly, when we think of climate change we tend to think of the immediate impacts of sea level rise, droughts, deforestation, typhoons and a general change of weather trends, which alone have devastating social and physical costs. However, the story of climate change is much more complicated than that. Climate change related events are compounded over existing challenges, from political one as authoritative regimes, political corruption, unrest and conflict, to social struggles such as poverty, inequality and displacement, and even physical, such as slum dwelling or informal settlements. All of these challenges are caused and affected by each other in a web of complex relations. Therefore, as Christian Parenti puts it we live in a world that is "primed for crisis" and "Catastrophic Convergence," where these problems "amplify each other, one expressing itself through another."¹⁴

In 2010, floods in Pakistan caused the country unprecedented damage and displaced millions of people; most were unable to return to their homes and farmlands, forcing them to travel "the country looking for shelter, food, and water."¹⁵

In 2013, Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines and was considered the strongest tropical cyclone that was ever recorded. Haiyan displaced over 2.5 million people and caused thousands to permanently relocate to "safer" areas in the Philippines.¹⁶

How will the world adept to a future where local and cross-border mobility become a common approach to climate change and climate change related events?

Unfortunately, it seems that the speed in which the world adapts to issues of climate change is very slow; or at least the conditions around us are changing a lot faster than the policies and agreements take place.

The conversation around the impact of human activities on the Earth's temperature goes back to the mid 1800s. In 1824, Joseph Fourier, a French mathematician and physicist, argued "the temperature of [the Earth] can be augmented by interposition of the atmosphere."¹⁷ Over one hundred years later, an English engineer and meteorology enthusiast called Guy S. Callendar, published a paper in the late 1930s "linking the burning of fossil fuels to the warming of the Earth's atmosphere."¹⁸ However, it wasn't until several years later that the conversation about the negative impacts of the global temperature rise began.

In 1955, the Canadian physicist Gilbert Plass predicted "CO2 levels would rise 30% from 1900 to 2000, warming planetary temperatures by about 1°C."¹⁹ A couple of years later, Charles David Keeling begins to monitor the rise in CO2 in through an observatory based in Mauna Lao in Hawaii. The Mauna Lao observatory and the measurement program that Keeling established persist until this day. "The Keeling Curve, the iconic graph that presents these data, is a powerful

13 Parenti, C. (2012). *Tropic of chaos: Climate change and the new geography of violence*. Nation books. p.4

14 Parenti, C. (2012). p.7

15 Pakistan Floods: The Deluge of Disaster - Facts & Figures as of 15 September 2010. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-floods-the-deluge-disaster-facts-figures-15-september-2010>

16 Typhoon Haiyan. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typhoon_Haiyan

17 1.4 Examples of Progress in Understanding Climate Processes. (2007). Retrieved May, 2016, from https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch1s1-4.html

18 Hickman, L. (2013, April 22). How the burning of fossil fuels was linked to a warming world in 1938 | Leo Hickman. Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2013/apr/22/guy-callendar-climate-fossil-fuels>

19 Gilbert Plass. (n.d.). Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://www.nndb.com/people/365/000275537/>

symbol of the human impact on the environment and the role of fossil fuels in global climate change."²⁰ This marked the shift in the conversation around carbon emissions and the association of human behaviors with the global temperature of the Earth.

It took another thirty years for the international community to officially react to the urgency of the impact of human behavior on the environment through a series of announcement, agreement and the establishment of new multilateral agencies: In 1987 the Montreal Protocol was signed to "to reduce the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances,"²¹ in 1988 the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) "was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) ... to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts,"²² and in 1992 the first Earth Summit took place in Rio De Janeiro which was the base of the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This was followed by the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon emissions in 1997, which finally became an international plan by 2005.

It took over 60 years from the time that CO2 emissions were linked to global temperature rise, to the establishment of international effort to address climate change. It has been 28 years from the time that IPCC announce that there is 90% evidence that human emissions and behavior are responsible for climate change,²³ however, the United States and China, the world's "largest contributors of greenhouse gases in 2014," still have not agreed to the Kyoto Protocol.²⁴ Also, it wasn't until 2015 that world leaders came together to commit to the Sustainable Development Goals during a meeting that took place in New York City. Meanwhile, the impacts of climate change are affecting millions of people's lives as we speak, and accelerating quicker than it took the international community, nation states and citizens, to realize the extent of the damages that we are doing and their impacts on the continuation of lives in the status quo.

Today, the conversation around the connection between conflict, climate change and displacement is taking place on the security and defense side. In 2008, the US Congress was briefed on the military implication of climate change on the United States: "Food insecurity for reasons both of shortages and affordability, will be a growing concern in Africa as well as other parts of the world. Without food aid, the region will likely face higher levels of instability--particularly violent ethnic clashes over land ownership."²⁵ There were other security reports in the US released warning about the effect of climate change on the national security and waves of migration.²⁶ At same time, other countries such as Australia and countries of the European Council were also developing similar reports, mainly related to national security.

However, if we look at the efforts to battle climate change at the level of the international community, we find that this complex interconnection of climate change, conflict and displacement is not much attention. Instead, the Sustainable Development Goals aim to eradicate or reduce many of what would be results from the "Catastrophic Convergence."

Instead, a few weeks after world leaders met in New York City to commit to the Sustainable Development Goals, European countries were blocking their border to refugees fleeing the war in Syria. Although the refugees were referred to as migrants at points, it was because there also many people fleeing war in Afghanistan and Iraq and others were migrants from North Africa, mainly fleeing economic degradation. Today, European countries unilaterally (and possibly illegally) closed their border for refugees and migrants who have gone through unthinkable

20 Keeling Curve. (2015, June). Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/education/whatischemistry/landmarks/keeling-curve.html>

21 THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEplete THE OZONE LAYER. (n.d.). Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://ozone.unep.org/treaties-and-decisions/montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer>

22 IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (n.d.). Retrieved May, 2016, from <https://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml>

23 Nuccitelli, D. (2013, September 27). Global warming: Why is IPCC report so certain about the influence of humans? | Dana Nuccitelli. Retrieved February, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2013/sep/27/global-warming-ipcc-report-humans>

24 Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts. (2016, March 30). Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/kyoto-protocol-fast-facts/>

CNN

25 Parenti, C. (2012). *Tropic of chaos: Climate change and the new geography of violence*. Nation books. p.13

26 Parenti, C. (2012). p.15

journeys.²⁷ European countries and the rest of the world have so far received less than 5% of the total number of refugees, while five countries in the Middle East and North Africa are housing the other 95%: Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.²⁸ Actually, Istanbul alone hosts more refugees than the entire European Union has granted asylum to.²⁹ Last month, the European Union and Turkey struck a new deal through which the EU will send back refugees and migrants who have reached European borders to Turkey.

The story of climate change is not limited to extreme weather events and sea level rise. The counter effects of climate change can include conflict, war, inequality, poverty, and mass forced displacement. This can lead to an extended status of crisis that reveals itself through politics of fear that materialize in extreme defense policies such as the current conservative rhetoric in United States in regards to Mexico border or the wall that has been erected between India and Bangladesh in the early 2000s to stop climate change migrants,³⁰ or the fences that were constructed over night on the borders of some European countries to stop the refugees and migrants. These policies have materialized in multinational agreement such the most recent one between the 28 European Union countries and Turkey, through which the EU will send thousands of refugees and migrants back to Turkey in exchange for “funding” of about six billion dollars to help the later in managing the “overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers” better.³¹

.....
27 Nebehay, S., & Baczynska, G. (2016, March 09). U.N., rights groups say EU-Turkey migrant deal may be illegal. Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0WA1D4>

28 Syria: The worst humanitarian crisis of our time. (2015, April 7). Retrieved April, 2016, from <https://www.amnesty.org.nz/syria-worst-humanitarian-crisis-our-time>
Amnesty International

29 Miliband, D. (2015, October 30). David Miliband | Cities are where the Syrian refugee crisis is at its worst. Retrieved May, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/oct/30/cities-are-at-the-centre-of-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-so-why-are-they-being-ignored>

30 Aneerjee, B. (2010, December 20). India is fencing off its border with Bangladesh. What will that mean for millions of potential climate refugees? Retrieved April, 2016, from http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/green_room/2010/12/the_great_wall_of_india

31 <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal>



THE CRISIS APPROACH

CRISIS IN THE CITY

The best way to address the challenges that the crisis narrative brings to the process of Urbanization in Motion is to refer to AbdouMaliq Simone writing on the impacts of the state on emergency on communities that are going through moments of crisis. The crisis narrative that is associated with these moments reduces people's lives "to a state of emergency. This means there is a rupture in the organization of the present."¹ In the case of forced displacement, this rupture is the forced separation of communities from their networks, systems and infrastructures. This state of emergency brings with it a sense of urgency, which is needed at the initial stages of the moments of crisis. However, when this moment is prolonged into a process of urbanization and movement to cities, the crisis narrative that was once meant to provide support and assistance is dragged into the urban setting, where these communities are working hard to break out of their moments of crisis in search for normalcy in existing systems and organizational structures.

Just as Simone's talks about the state of emergency, the crisis narrative puts a halt to what he refers to as the "flexibility of interpretation."² It removes the choice and "ability to put [something] off until another day."³ This narrative represents situations where "there is no normality to refer to, no feeling of something unraveling."⁴ The moment that people are forcibly displaced the state of emergency and the crisis narrative that comes with it begin. The problems however beginning when with this state of emergency is prolonged over years and decades. According to Simone "emergency leaves no time for accounting, no time to trace out the precise etiology of the crisis, for the sequence of causation is suspended in the urgency of the moment where recklessness may be as important as causation ... Emergency describes a process of things in the making, of the emergence of new thinking and practice still unstable, still tentative in terms of use of which such thinking and practice will be put."⁵

Although AbdouMaliq Simone is referring to the experiences of communities dealing with state of emergency in African cities, the feeling of instability, tentative presence and loss of ability to make future plans are at the essence of the experiences of people who have been forcibly displaced. In the process of Urbanization in Motion, refugees and migrants are expected to be and are treated as temporary additions to population in the cities and towns they seek. Therefore, host countries in many cases are resistant to creating any long term, structural or legal effort to bridge between the local and the host communities. In addition to that, humanitarian aid agencies although aim to provide assistance through stipends and training programs, struggle due to having insufficient access to the refugees, limiting host state policies and their reactive strategies that are designed to address temporary moments and to function in controlled spaces such as refugee camps and rural areas.⁶

In 2010 during the UNFCCC's 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16), the international community officially accepted mobility as an informal adaptation mechanism to climate change, with the expectation that most of this movement will be directed towards cities.⁷ Therefore, we can agree that mobility is accepted as a form of adaptation to all extreme events, be it environmental, economic or political, and that the mobility of people will become more of a trend as the effects of climate change and the risks of conflict increase. However, this movement of people is still regarded temporary, an unanticipated crisis, and the immediate, and at many times long term, humanitarian responses are to develop temporary settlements in forms of camps in order to house people until the conditions in their home country are safe for them to return.

Establishing camps is the first response to a humanitarian crisis that involves the mass displacement of people. The locations of camps are usually outside major cities, on country

1 Simone, A. M. (2004). For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities. Durham: Duke University Press. p.4

2 Simone, A. M. (2004). For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities. Durham: Duke University Press. p.5

3 Simone, A. M. (2004). p.5

4 Simone, A. M. (2004). p.4

5 Simone, A. M. (2004). p.4

6 Earle, L. (n.d.). Urban Crises and the New Urban Agenda (p. 3, Working paper). Environment & Urbanization - International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

7 COP16 | CMP6. (n.d.). Retrieved March, 2016, from <http://cc2010.mx/en/>

From November 29 - December 10, 2010

borders or on rural land.⁸ Camps, by definition are temporary, providing people with basic needs such as water, shelter and food until the conditions that caused their displacement to begin with are alleviated. Camps also become places where registration, quantification and management of the flow of people take place.⁹ A process that has been highly critiqued in migration and refugee studies.

As history has repeatedly proven to us, camps and temporary settlements tend to last much longer than they are originally designed for, simply because the reasons that lead to their creation are often long term that span over decades. As for the process of asylum seeking, which is considered the way out of these crisis situation for people that hold a refugee status, statistics show that only 1% of refugees are granted asylum while the rest remain living in temporary situations.¹⁰

The prolonged settlement for refugees and migrants in camps creates a contradiction between the temporary physical structure of the camp and the permanence of the recurring daily life activities over time: from simple things such as washing clothes, cooking, going to schools, establishing businesses and giving birth. This permanent temporarily of the camp leads many to lose hope in ever going home and therefore relocate to cities in search of permanent supportive infrastructures.¹¹

Also, the longer camps last, the more they begin to resemble cities. However, in these cases, these cities are temporary in terms of their recognition by the states that host them, and often in their physical appearance represented by their building materials. Over the span of 67 years, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon have transformed from tents located on the edge of major cities to dense concrete dwellings for people whose political status remains temporary. Over time, Lebanese cities grew around these camps which are now located in metropolitan boundary of some cities. These camps, even though now hold buildings built from concrete, a material that represents long-term dwelling, they remain gated and their "citizens" hold a temporary refugee status and have limitations on their access to jobs and other services in the country. Another example of a newer camp that is transforming into a city is in the infamous Syrian refugee camp in Jordan called Zaatari, in reference to the area where it is located. The camp was the first refugee settlement built in response to the conflict in Syrian in order to assist the first flows of people fleeing the war. The camp today is considered as largest refugee camp in the Middle East.¹² In 2014 over a phone interview, a representative from the Norwegian Refugee Council mentioned a potential plan for a program that attempts to "urbanize" Zaatari camp by providing piped water, building roads and running electrical cables, and it is assumed that these plans have occurred.¹³

In his book Planet of Slums, Mike Davis reminds us that refugee camps evolve into slum cities over time: "International refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are often more harshly treated even than urban evictees — and some of the Third World's huge refugee camps have evolved into edge cities in their own right." He gives examples of the Gaza strip, "considered by some to be the world's largest Slum," Dadaab on the Kenyan border and four camps on the border's of Khartoum's desert, where "victims of drought, famine and civil war" have been living for years.¹⁴

8 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). *Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

9 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011).

10 Resettlement. (n.d.). Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html>


The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)

11 Bonar, Emma, phone interview with Youth Project Manager at the Norwegian Refugee Council, November, 2014.

12 Jordan's Za'atari refugee camp turns three, challenges for the future of thousands living there. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/55b7737b6.html>

13 Bonar, Emma, phone interview with Youth Project Manager at the Norwegian Refugee Council, November, 2014.


14 Davis, M. (2006). The Prevalence of Slums. In *Planet of slums* (p. 48). London: Verso.



**1948 NAHR EL BARED
Lebanon**



**1992 DADAAB
Kenya**



**NOW NAHR EL BARED
Lebanon**



**2015 DADAAB
Kenya**

In 2014, UNHCR has started exploring a new program to replace refugee camps by a new approach called the “Alternative to Camps.”¹⁵ So far, it seems that there has not been progress on this program, but knowing that the majority of refugees and migrants move to cities instead of camps, how can we start to think of cities as the alternatives to camps?

Cities are however, becoming the alternative to camps without the planning of refugee and aid organizations. As people prefer to live in cities over camps, as we will see in the following chapter, the camps are no longer the “solution” for displacement on the long run.¹⁶ This process is pulling the crisis narrative that is associated with the camps into cities. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the crisis narrative is based on temporality and the investment in individuals rather than communities. As the crisis narrative follows people into cities, it maintains its temporal approach, trying to apply mechanisms designed for meeting immediate and basic needs in controlled spaces, into the new and dynamic environment.¹⁷

Aid organizations however are trying to keep up with the new context on which they are operating. In Istanbul for example, aid organizations are shifting from addressing basic needs and are focusing on providing psychological support through community centers, workshops and health clinics. Other organizations provide legal advice that helps refugees in the city keep up with the new policies and are aware of their rights in the city. However, as typical to aid organization and not-for-profits, in Istanbul these organizations work in silos with limited efforts to coordinate among themselves, work across scales and disciplines or partner with other sectors. In addition to that, many organizations have limits on the amount of effort that they are able to place of bridging gaps between the Turkish and Syrian communities, due to funding and capacity restrictions. This approach to operations is typical to the crisis narrative that depicts a situation as temporary and therefore cancels out any efforts for establishing long-term approaches.

World leaders signed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on September 25, 2015. World leaders came together in New York City to promise that they will collectively work towards a more inclusive and sustainable planet. However, since forced displacement falls under the crisis narrative, it was not addressed as part of the SDGs as a challenge that stands in the way of developing a sustainable world. This was evident in the so-called “European Refugee Crisis.”

The flow of refugees towards Europe that started to appear on daily news coverage in 2015, had multiple interconnected and complex layers: first it had (and still has a now controversial) humanitarian dimension, an international and country specific policy dimension and it fell under several international treaties and agreements. Multiple articles have been written about the impacts of the restrictive border policies have on the above dimensions. However, while keeping that in mind, I am interested here in looking at this social condition of refugees trying to access Europe through the lens of the Sustainable Development Goals. Here, I will remove this condition from the crisis narrative and place examine it as a long term process of Urbanization in Motion. As a form of urbanization, I will argue that the restrictive responses of some of the European countries to this process of urbanizations falls short in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals focusing on goals 10, 11 and 17 as they apply here the most.

Goal 10 of the SDGs is titled “Reduce inequality within and among countries.” Its targets aim to “ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard,” and to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.”¹⁸

This goal directly applies to this case. Since 2012, the United Nations had been calling for European Union to revise their border policies in order to host more refugees and asylum seekers.¹⁹ However, until this day most EU countries are still resisting taking any bold actions in accepting refugees into their communities. This clearly falls short of eliminating “discriminatory laws, policies and practices.” In addition to that, many refugees have died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in efforts to reach Europe. Again, European countries did not make any

¹⁵ UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps. (n.d.). Retrieved December 16, 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/5422b8f09.html>

¹⁶ Refer to Chapter From Camp to City in this document

¹⁷ Earle, L. (n.d.). Urban Crises and the New Urban Agenda (p. 3, Working paper). Environment & Urbanization - International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

¹⁸ Inequality - United Nations Sustainable Development Action 2015. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/>

¹⁹ Syria Crisis: UNHCR urges European Union states to honour their asylum system principles. (2012, October 16). Retrieved February, from <http://www.unhcr.org/507d4c586.html>

effort to “facilitate” the transport of people who are fleeing war and discrimination. United Nations experts have said that in order to save the lives of asylum seekers, “rich countries must take in one million refugees.”²⁰ This could even be considered a small number when you consider that “poor” countries, smaller in terms of land and economic capacity such as Lebanon and Jordan, are hosting most the Syrian refugees.^{21,22}

Goal 11 of the SDGs is directly related to cities and aims to “make cities inclusive, safe resilient and sustainable.” The first target under goal 11 is: “By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.”²³


If we focus on the Syrian refugee crisis alone, the number of refugees in Syria’s neighboring countries is staggering: at the time of writing there are about 2.5 million refugees in Turkey,²⁴

20 Jackson, G. (2015, April 22). UN Expert: Rich Countries Must Take in 1 Million Refugees to Stop Boat Deaths. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/22/un-urges-wealthy-countries-to-take-one-million-syrian-refugees-in-next-five-years>
 21 UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Lebanon. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/country.php?id=122>
 22 UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Jordan. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/country.php?id=107>
 23 Cities - United Nations Sustainable Development Action 2015. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities/>
 24 UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Turkey. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/country.php?id=224>

one million registered in Lebanon²⁵ and over 600 thousand in Jordan.²⁶ Some live in camps and many live in informal settlements in cities, in most cases dealing with restrictions on access to work and services,²⁷ in addition to the 2.5 million in Turkey and other smaller numbers divided between Egypt and Iraq. However, at the time of writing, the European Union agreed to relocate only “120,000 asylum seekers,”²⁸ a fraction of the almost 4 million displaced people mainly living in developing countries.


Jordan and Lebanon are countries with weak economies and in the past have already housed Palestinian refugees in camps that have now developed into informal cities. Both countries also struggle with lack of resources, especially water, and infrastructure. The large increase in population in these countries is creating challenging conditions for both refugees and citizens.²⁹ As for Turkey, the refugee crisis has become a chess piece in the Turkish-EU agreement as of the most recent multinational agreement in which Turkey agreed to take back refugees that had been smuggled to Europe in exchange for a large amount of money and more lenient visa regulations for Turkish citizens to access EU countries.³⁰

25 UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Lebanon. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/country.php?id=122>
 26 UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Jordan. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/country.php?id=107>
 27 Martinez, M. (2015, September 10). Syrian refugees: Which Countries Welcome Them, Which Ones Don't. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/world/welcome-syrian-refugees-countries/>
 28 EU Reaches Deal on Disputed Refugee Quotas. (2015, September 23). Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/eu-attempt-resolve-refugee-quota-dispute-150922044717786.html>
 29 UNHCR. Lebanon. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486676.html>
 30 Collett, E. (2016, March). The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. (Migration Policy Institute) Retrieved May 1, 2016, from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal>



In Istanbul the internationally affiliated organizations met on a monthly basis, so did the faith-based organization.

However there is limited to no coordination between the efforts of these group together.



The restrictions the EU countries have on refugees and the small number of asylum seekers they are accepting to resettle, are only adding more social and economic pressure on the above countries, especially Jordan and Lebanon. This means, instead of working to upgrade slums, rich countries are playing a major role in creating additional informal settlements and exacerbating poor social conditions.

If the European countries and other “rich” countries around the world continue to treat refugees as a threat to their own development and prosperity, they should be considered as actively expanding the rich/poor gap even further. Therefore, the final goal 17 of Sustainable Development Goals, which aims to create partnerships to help developing countries grow their economies³¹ cannot be achieved. Providing financial assistance to developing countries without alleviating some of the sources that are leading to inequality and economic degradation will not be successful. It is like putting a Band-Aid on a mortal wound.

If the rich countries do not step up to lift the burden of the developing countries through hosting large numbers of refugees, the conditions in the later countries will worsen with risks of the rise of additional refugee slum cities and degradation in the environmental, social and political conditions of the most vulnerable communities.

Just as human actions are linked to Climate Change, global political actions have an impact on social conditions. The decisions that are made by the rich countries about their approach to refugees will have a major impact on the lives of millions: refugees and the countries hosting them, and will add another layer to the challenges of achieving a more sustainable world.

As we approach Habitat III, which will take place in Quito in the summer of 2016, we must look to find ways to redefine sustainability and develop tools and policies to hold countries accountable to these international declarations, agreements and goals; especially in cases where time plays a major factor on the future of thousands and millions of people. Today, as we are experiencing the effects of climate change coupled with socio-political factors, more evidently than ever, the case of the Syrian refugees and economic migrants from other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, is proving that the movement of people towards cities is becoming more urgent. How can cities and their host communities become equipped to adapt to this mass movement of people? As mentioned earlier, people who seek refuge in cities are seeking a continuation to their livelihoods that go beyond the saving of their lives; they are looking for support networks that are embedded in the urban sphere, away from the temporary approaches under the crisis narrative. One can argue that under the crisis narrative similar to the emergency status, “the social support system is rooted in extended family connections, local reciprocity, and various compositions of shared ties once relied on to sustain the semblance of the dynamic and stable urban quarters, are becoming increasingly strained.”³²

As AbdouMaliq Simone puts it as he refers to African Cities, I argue that as long as the process of Urbanization in Motion remains under the crisis narrative “what we may know conventionally as legality and illegality, war and peace, the corporeal and spiritual, the formal and the informal, and the movement and home are brought into a proximity that produces a highly ambiguous sense of place.”³³ This ambiguous sense of place in the city keeps the refugee and migrant presence in the city viewed and dealt with as the other, the outsider and the temporary.

This brings me to the city as a destination.

31 Partnerships - United Nations Sustainable Development Action 2015. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/>

32 Simone, A. M. (2004). For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities. Durham: Duke University Press. p.2

33 Simone, A. M. (2004). For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities. Durham: Duke University Press. p.2

**THE CITY
WE SEEK**

REFUGE IN THE CITY

So far, I have been writing about the forces that lead to displacement and the approaches that are typical for addressing the humanitarian challenges associated with it. The argument here is that people fleeing war and other forms of violence seek cities for refuge. As we saw earlier, people are feeling to cities because they do not want to live in camps. Therefore, one can say that this is an active process that entails decision-making, preparations and actions. But, how much choice do people fleeing war torn countries or desperate climate or economic condition have?

This chapter will address the issue of choice and with that identifying the types of choices that are available for people who are forcibly displaced. I will go to focus on the city as a destination, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that the city as a territory and space presents the people that seek it. I will draw from my findings on the case of Syrian refugees in Istanbul to give examples of how this process manifested in the city. I will also try to make comparisons to how it might apply to other forms of migration.

Let us first agree that referring to the decision to flee to a city instead of going to camp as a "choice" is not accurate, simply because the initial decision to leave one's home, town, city or country was not by choice to begin with. The amount of choice given to people who are forcibly displaced is very limited and, as we will see in the next few paragraphs, is highly dependent on people's socio-economic conditions combined with the policies and regulations of the countries they seek. I will call this "non-choice" action here a "preference" to avoid any confusion regarding the matter.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, my interest in this project is not the forces that lead to displacement, rather it is what happens after people are displaced, and how the limitations that are imposed on their bodies by labels (reinforced by international policies and agreements) affect their lives as they seek refuge in new cities and spaces. Through my research, I was able to identify three major routes of displacement regardless of the forces that cause them. These routes are highly dependent on the economic status of the people involved, their social networks and the destinations they seek.

The first route is one that we do not hear much about in the media or we don't think of when we think of refugees and migrants (this applies to the climate change migrants not to the economic migrants). This is related to people who have access to the financial backing and/or international social networks. Money and networks play a key role in the possibilities a refugee or migrant has after the crisis occurs and they need to flee; sometimes these privileges kick in even before the displacement occurs, but the indicators for a crisis are visible. This group of people has access to more options (again not choices). Money can ensure access to travel visas, apartments in other countries or cities and access to healthcare and education. Social and business networks also make it easier for a refugee and migrants to have a sponsor to facilitate their travel. Also, some may own property internationally or have dual citizenships that will give them a big advantage over other groups of people.

Even though these options are also dependent on the city to which people prefer to flee to, the access to financial backing and social networks make the transition and adaptation to the new location faster, and most importantly, it completely cancels out the option of going to a refugee camp. For example, in Istanbul many Syrian refugees who had access to money did not have to go through the refugee channels. Instead, they were able to utilize the "investor's (or business) visa" option provided by the Turkish government. This option allows people who are able to pay the required fees to start a business in the country on the condition of having one Turkish partner. Now, Istanbul has multiple Syrian restaurants and businesses that have opened in the past five years since the start of the war. The case is different in Lebanon, where the policies for owning and starting businesses are more restrictive for refugees and Syrian residents, and where the political conditions are more complicated that Syrians themselves may try to avoid fleeing to the country if they had other options. However, access to services, housing and education remains easier for this group of people in a city like Beirut.

As for the climate change migrants, the case is at times easier because many migrants fleeing extreme environmental conditions go to cities in their own countries where they remain citizens

and have access to local services and assistance programs. Regarding cross-border migrants, they will face similar restrictions and opportunities as ones mentioned above.

The second route I was able to identify is the one to the temporary camps; a route that is a popular image of what the "refugee life" looks like. As discussed above, camps are the immediate reaction to a crisis situation and are essential for providing for the humanitarian needs that a situation of crisis imposes on people. However, as we saw earlier, camps tend to last much longer than they are designed or intended for. It is the long-run aspect of the camp that becomes problematic for the people living in it and the organizations running it. In the case of refugees, for example the camp becomes a space that is holding them back from the continuity of their lives. In the camp refugees, do not belong to existing economic, social, political or physical systems of any place in the world. The camp becomes a tool to "contain" people and "keep them a distance"¹ from the rest of the world that is "not" going through, related to or involved in this moment of crisis.

In the case of war refugees who fall under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, the preference of living in cities over refugee camps may seem counter intuitive. In a camp, people move into a space that has been carved out specifically for them. The space provides them with the basic needs such as shelter, safety, food and services for free and without any effort on the part of the refugee. Refugees in camps have access to kitchens (in many cases communal), schools, skills training and counseling, all provided by UNHCR, other international NGOs and/or local government agencies.² However, despite the fact that camps provide all the needs and services for a refugee not to fend for his/herself, many people prefer to life in cities.

The life of a refugee in a camp is highly monitored and controlled. In Jordan for example, once registered in a camp, a refugee needs to have a permit from The UN Refugee Agency that manages the camp in order for him/her to leave. The permits are restrictive and are only issued in special cases such as sickness or death. Another option for leaving the camp is to have a Jordanian citizen that will "vouch for them," which usually means guaranteeing that the refugee will have access to an adequate life outside the camp. There are cases where refugees desperate to leave the camp, pay Jordanian citizen to sponsor them only to get a chance to live outside of the camp.³ Turkey also imposes the permit system on refugees in camps. There the camps are managed by the Turkish government and are guarded by Turkish police.⁴ Despite all the restrictions and the challenges outside of the camp, refugees still prefer to leave because they find life in the camps "boring," repetitive, temporary and in some case prison-like.⁵ Outside of the camp people seek employment and continuity, despite the fact they face multiple challenges that range from finding adequate residence to jobs, access to education and healthcare and even social integration.⁶

In the case of climate change migrants or disaster refugees (this does not apply to economic migrants), we need to make a distinction between two categories that are affected by the time span of the process of displacement. This time span impacts the attention that a crisis situation receives on an international level and the amount of national and international aid provided.

Some climate change impacts are only visible over a long period of time; these include drought, heat waves or change in rain patterns. Sudden forces that involve abrupt destruction are not displacing people fleeing these long-span impacts of climate change. This lack of abruptness

1 Agier, M., & Fernbach, D. (2011). Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government. Cambridge, UK: Polity. (p18)

2 Bonar, Emma, phone interview with Youth Project Manager at the Norwegian Refugee Council, November, 2014.

3 The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighboring Countries: Finding Conclusions and Recommendations. (Rep. No. 189). (2014). Orsam.

4 Orsam Report (2014)

5 Orsam Report (2014)

6 Orsam Report (2014)

means that the speed and scale in which people are displaced is slower. This group of people does not require the establishment of temporary settlements because it is likely that the people involved will seek urban areas over time and will result in a slow process of Urbanization in Motion. Examples of this process in happening in Bangladesh In Southeast Asia, Dhaka receives 2000 people a day fleeing the rural areas of the country where changing climate trends has impacted the livelihoods of farmers.⁷ However, in Somalia for example, people fleeing famine induced by droughts are seeking refuge in Dadaab refugee camp in Northern Kenya; a camp that has been housing Somali war refugees for over 20 years. "Conditions in Dadaab have never been far away from desperate, but the surge of refugees fleeing drought in Somalia added even further to the milieu of difficulties that life in Dadaab entails."⁸

The second group consists of people fleeing fast extreme weather events such as floods, typhoons and tsunamis, where the destruction and humanitarian needs are immediately visible, abrupt and shocking. In this case, the establishing temporary camps are a common practice to deal with the immediate effects of an extreme environment event.⁹ The case is similar to that of the refugee with the exception that the camps are usually carved out locally, meaning that the people displaced are considered internally displaced. However, this does not change the fact that the people involved remain separated from the rest of the country, living a temporary existence and therefore prefer to move to nearby cities.

The final route that I identified is the one to the urban settings. Here, I do not mean the route of asylum seekers (refer to the chapter of Forces of Displacement). Instead, I am referring to people who do not have access to financial backing and influential social networks that assist in making the route to the city attainable, and yet make the "non-choice" of going to the city instead of living in a temporary camp. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to elaborate on the experience and the challenges that are involved in this "non-choice."

Needless to say, this route is the most complicated of the three. In addition to being subject to all the urban challenges that preexist in any city, migrants taking this route are more vulnerable since they do not have access to their social networks, previous jobs or financial support, and in many cases, have lost all their belongings due to displacement. In the case of war refugees, the legal status of an urban refugee depends on whether they are registered or not with UNHCR. It also depends on the city people seek. Some countries are trying to discourage refugees from living in cities by limiting access to jobs and healthcare. In most cases, if a refugee is not registered, meaning he or she do not hold an official refugee status that is issued either by the local government (for example, Turkey) or by UNHCR (Lebanon, Jordan), they might be considered illegal immigrants and therefore lose their international protection. Also, in some cases, people who start their journey in a refugee camps decide to leave when they are able to go to cities instead. This case becomes recurrent the longer people have spent in camps or when their economic situation improves and they are able to afford the life in cities.

We know now that people do not prefer to leave the camp because of lack capacity or services, instead, this preference is directly related to the quality of life people seek. The question here then is:

What kind of life does the city provide and what are the incentives in the city that lead people to seek it?

The straightforward answer to the question of why people come to cities is that people view the camp as a temporary and restrictive space that lacks opportunities for economic growth and in the city they seek the space for economic engagement and social participation; they find opportunities for the continuation of their lives.

7 McPherson, P. (2015, December 01). Dhaka: The city where climate refugees are already a reality. Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/dec/01/dhaka-city-climate-refugees-reality>
8 Thanki, N. (2012). Somali 'climate refugees' in Kenya: A consideration and a suggestion. Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.earthinbrackets.org/2012/04/28/somali-climate-refugees-in-kenya-a-consideration-and-a-suggestion/>
9 Internally Displaced People. (n.d.). Retrieved April, 2016, from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html>

Some of the language used to describe the movement of the people who have been forcibly displaced is language attributed to liquids; we hear phrases such as: the flow of people, the flood of refugees, the spillage or the leaking into other countries. I find these choices of words interesting as it pertains to the characteristics of liquid. Zygmunt Bauman applies the characteristics of liquidity and the liquid form to the "modernity discourse." Here, I will borrow from Bauman and direct this metaphor of fluidity to explore how this trait attributed to people who are displaced, transforms as they move from being citizens to becoming displaced.¹⁰

Liquid form, on contrary to solids, lacks the bonding elements and is unable to "hold its shape." Bauman describes the liquid form as "not easily stopped," its chemical and physical makeup does not change when interacting with solids, however it has the ability to distort solid. As liquids flow they can "absorb," "soak," or "drench" solids they come in contact with. Liquids are mobile and therefore Bauman associates them with being "light." Even though technically, liquids may be heavier than solid, however, their ability to move and maneuver obstacles makes them light.

People by nature are mobile, however, unlike liquids we find our bonding elements (to stay in the line with the metaphor) through belonging to systems, communities and the relationships that hold us together. J.B. Jackson, refers to humans as "political animals" that are unsatisfied by merely being present; rather we have a "need for sustained discourse, for the exchange of ideas and ... disagreement." It is this discourse and interplay between individuals that create and constantly modify the "landscapes" in which we live.¹¹ It is through this discourse that we create social ties that keep us tethered to each other¹² and therefore, I will argue give us the bonding elements that hold us in place. AbdouMaliq Simone talks about this discourse as occurring in the "between" spaces among individuals. He says that 'what it is possible for people to do with each other is largely a question of what it is that exists between them, and how this 'between' can be shaped as active points of reference, connection and anchorage.'¹³ These networks and relations keep us flexible yet anchored to a system to which we belong. They allow us to "hold" our shape and place.

Before the war or you can insert another disruptive force here: conflict, flood, rising sea level; basically, before being displaced, people were living in their towns and cities. They were members of social networks, communities and families; they had jobs, bank accounts, and were able to plan ahead; they had homes, some owned land and others farmed; they belonged to churches, mosques, temples; they had enemies; they had a political voice, maybe they voted, disagreed and made their own decision about what is best for them. They were legal citizens of a defined space and territory and they chose to stay or go. They were anchored. With violence, whether it is through actual weapons or through life threatening degradation of the status quo, comes uprooting and the loss of bonding elements. Therefore, comes the liquid form.

So, what happens to a society when it is displaced? The people exist, but their anchorage and bonding elements is what gets destroyed. They become fluid individuals and smaller communities. The strong ties that exist between family members on the micro level remain, but the weak ties that link these individual to the macro system is lost.¹⁴ This is where the fluidity begins. And let's not forget that the nature of liquid is that without being controlled, contained and directed it will flow until it finds its own space where it can settle. Similarly, refugee camps, national and international policies and multinational agreements become tools for control and containment. The communities involved do not remain in specific spaces because they have been anchored; instead, it is because they have been contained. The anchoring elements and systems are available in cities in forms of social, political, economic and physical systems of infrastructures. Therefore, the city becomes a quest for belonging to systems and communities. However, these systems and communities cannot be imposed on people as in the case of a refugee camp. Bauman brings to our attention the importance of the "choice" an individual has in belonging to a community.

10 Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Forward on Being Light and Liquid Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
11 Jackson, J. B. (1984). *Discovering the Vernacular Landscape*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. A pair of Ideal Landscapes
12 Jackson, J. B. (1984).
13 Simone, A. M. (2004). For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities. Durham: Duke University Press.
14 Granovetter, M. S. (may, 1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), 1360-1363.

Ahmed (not his real name) is a Syrian refugee in his early twenties. I met Ahmed by accident when I went to dinner with some friends to a Turkish Syrian restaurant in the Beyoglu neighborhood in Istanbul. Beyoglu is one of the least conservative neighborhoods in Istanbul with restaurants and bars that are spread out in its alleyway. Ahmed and I met for a coffee a few days later and he told me his story. Ahmed came to Istanbul seeking options and ways of continuing his life. In Syria, he came from a conservative family, however he himself was not conservative. Ahmed told me his struggles in finding a community that welcomed him in Istanbul. One of the anchoring elements for people living in Istanbul is religion, for Ahmed this was problematic since he did not relate to this anchor and looked for other ways of belonging in this new city, consequently, he moved between several neighborhoods looking for a place where he could settle.

On an individual level, different refugees decided to come to Istanbul for different reasons; some came for the jobs, others because they knew friends and family members who lived in the city and some came for the opportunity to get smuggled to Europe. Ahmed came because he was wanted to apply for a student visa in the United States, a process that he has been unsuccessful so far. In the city, people are looking for support systems that are embedded in daily activities of inclusion, participation and belonging. Cities are economic engines, they are the spaces where the physical, social, political and economic infrastructures intersect, and where production is centered. The combination of what the city offers is an opportunity for the continuation of the lives that have been disrupted.

Istanbul is a city of over 14 million people, distributed over 39 districts. The city is currently hosting over 350000 Syrian refugees. What I was interested in is how people were able to city when they first arrived. How did they find their housing, their jobs, doctors, and services? It is important to point out here that the Turks and Syrians do not speak each other's languages, and a third common language between the two nationalities, except for Kurdish.


One of the people I interviewed in Istanbul was Didem Danis, an Associate Professor at Galatsaray University Sociology Department, in Istanbul with a focus on migration and doctoral thesis on social networks of Iraqi transit migrants in Istanbul. She was the first person I interviewed in order to get a general framework on migration in Istanbul. In regards to the Syrian refugees in Istanbul, Didem spoke to me about the importance of religious, cultural and historic "anchors" for the refugees who are living outside of camps.

Historically Turkey has been dealing with internal and cross-border migration, the most prominent waves of migration are those of Kurdish communities who live inside Turkey and in neighboring countries such as Kurdistan, Iraq and Syria. Before, the Syrian war and consequently the large number of displacement, the anchor elements in Turkey were cultural, mainly in relation to the Kurdish communities. These anchoring elements are key in determining where people live in the new city. Given that the migration patterns were predominantly Kurdish, migrants settled in Kurdish neighborhoods in Turkish cities. This is typical for any wave of migration into cities. In the case of the Syrian refugees, Dedem points out a new pattern for Turkey that focuses more on the religious and historic anchoring elements and that marks a shift from cultural anchoring to religious one in Turkey.

Most of the Syrian refugees who come into Turkish cities through the third route as mentioned above are lower middle-class and working class conservative Sunni Muslims, however, there are also many Kurds and Turkmens. Where people decided to live in Istanbul depended on a combination on the level of religiosity and languages they spoke. For example, the Kurds spoke Kurdish and preferred to live in Kurdish neighborhoods, while the Turkmen spoke Turkish and Kurdish and so they had more choice on where they lived. When coming to Istanbul, the conservative Muslims who did not speak Turkish or Kurdish went to neighborhoods in the city that matched their religiosity and culture. Despite the fact that people spoke a different language, they found solace in living close to people who are similar to them. These neighborhoods were mainly on the city periphery with some in the city center, I focused on Aksaray and the Malta Market area in the Fatih district on the European side of the city.

Fatih district is one of the largest districts in Istanbul and it includes the historic area where the Blue Mosque, Hagia Sophia, the Grand Bazaar and other tourist landmarks are located. Fatih is also known to be more Muslim conservative than other neighborhoods in the city center on the European side such as Beyoglu or Taksim across the Golden Horn. Aksaray is both a commercial

and residential neighborhood, known now as little Syria. With the arrival of the Syrian refugees, many opened businesses in Aksaray, historically a neighborhood of immigrant communities. The more Syrians that moved into the neighborhood, the more Syrians it attracted. People that I interviewed in that neighborhood said that they moved to Aksaray for one or a combination of two reasons: 1) there are many Syrians who live there, and 2) because it is closer to them culturally. By that, they meant that it had a level of conservativeness that they were able to relate to. But most importantly, it was a place where they were able to start businesses.



The city as a territory actively acts to keep the refugees separate from its citizens in terms of access to rights and jobs. They remain temporary, with temporary statuses and existence. For the refugee in Istanbul the city as a space and the city as a territory acts two forces pulling in opposite directions, where refugees sit in the middle space struggling to keep some form of normalcy in their lives.

The Malta Market is medium sized street market that covers about four or five pedestrian blocks and is located a few miles north of Aksaray. The market shares a wall with Fatih Mosque, which is prominent in the neighborhood in terms of scale and significance, both historically and currently. The market was once mainly Turkish restaurant and produce has become predominantly filled with Syrian restaurants, with a few Turkish stores here and there. The Market is actually the location of the first Syrian restaurant that opened in the beginning of the Syrian conflict at the end of 2011.

Another important point that Didem Danis brought up during our interview is that the shift from cultural anchoring to religious one is also visible in the state's support to the refugees coming into the city. For example, although I was not able to research this further, some municipalities are using the Muslim rhetoric to bridge gaps between the Syrian refugees and the Turkish communities. One thing that I was able to qualify is the fact that the government is supportive of faith based Syrian relief organizations. One of these organizations is called the Syrian Nur Association for Relief, otherwise known as Nur Association.

I was able to interview the head of the Turkey branch in Istanbul and two members of his staff. With the help of state support, the Nur Association was able to establish a Syrian only school and a clinic in the Fatih district, near Aksaray, therefore creating additional anchor points for Syrians in the city. The school is run by mainly volunteer teachers and a few paid staff members and teaches an amended Syrian curriculum that is approved by the Turkish Ministry of Education. The clinic provides free healthcare services to Syrians and also provides assistance in acquiring medication or access to other hospitals.

However, as we saw in the case of Ahmed, this form of religious anchoring does not work for everyone. When he first moved to Istanbul, Ahmed lived in a communal apartment in the conservative Fatih area. There, his roommates were judgmental of his actions that did not completely comply with their beliefs and traditions. For example, Ahmed consumed alcohol and worked in places that served it, both are practices not accepted in conservative Muslim communities. He got into arguments and fights with several people he lived with and moved from one apartment to the next. He found his home through social media and friends of friends; people he didn't know but were also Syrians. Finally, Ahmed wasn't able to find or afford his next room and ended up sleeping public gardens for about six weeks until he was finally hired in the restaurant where I met him. Now Ahmed lives in Beyoglu with three other Syrian men. They don't agree on everything but they stay out of each other's business and are able to coexist. He also goes to a Syrian privately owned community center in the neighborhood where is learning both Turkish and English in the hopes that he will one day make it to the United States.

In the city, Ahmed, like many other Syrians was able to find his space of inclusion and support. However, Istanbul, just like any other city, is a territory in the sense that it is a "portion" of geographic land governed by regulatory legal systems that are connected to larger national and global ones. It is these systems that limit and control the accessibility of different "categories" to a geographic space.¹⁵ In this case, the Turkish government has placed multiple regulatory systems in order to control the mobility of the Syrian refugee outside of camps.

The history of Turkey with these regulatory systems starts with Geneva Convention. Turkey was one of the first countries to sign the 1951 agreement however, including a clause of "territory limitations." This clause meant that the Turkish government only allowed citizens from the Council of Europe to seek asylum in Turkey and officially resettle in the country; all other nationalities are granted temporary asylum, meaning they are expected to find long-term solutions elsewhere. Although there has been an amendment to the Turkish refugee law in 2014 to close some loopholes, Syrian refugees in Turkey are still not considered refugees in the sense that have the right for asylum in the country, instead they are considered guests. This gives them most of the rights that fall under the 1951 Geneva Convention with the exception to the path to citizenship. This means that refugee in Turkey remain temporary. This temporality is also manifested in other forms of documents that are meant to control the mobility of the refugees across Turkish cities.

Turkey has applied a refugee identity card system, where each refugee once registered is provided an identity card that grants him/her access to services such as healthcare and education. Recently, this identity card also allowed for the path to work permits. However, this

.....
¹⁵ Gottman, J. (1975). The Evolution of the Concept of Territory (p. 31, Rep. No. 14). Paris: The Institute d'Ecoles Politique.

same card is now being used to control the circulation of refugees between cities; if a refugee is registered in Istanbul they are not able to go to another city and gain access to the same services or jobs. I was told by one of the NGOs I interviewed that this new regulation was put into place as a tool to limit the number of refugees being smuggled across the borders to Europe due to the pressure, and the recent deal that was struck between the Turkish Government and the European Union.

Given the restrictive policies that are amended and influenced by larger political pressures, the position of the refugee in the city remains temporary, where they continue to walk a thin line between being legal and illegal. The refugee remains a "border man" or woman, where his or her borders are in constant flux as they shift from being limited to the country to the city and even neighborhood depending on their documentation and the most recent policies that are put in place.

Therefore, these non-choices that people are making as they seek cities remain temporary options. This presents a paradox that is hard to address: in the city people are seeking long-term conditions of inclusion and economic growth, however, the city as a territory actively acts to keep the refugees separate from its citizens in terms of access to rights and jobs. They remain temporary, with temporary statuses and existence. For the refugee in Istanbul the city as a space and the city as a territory acts two forces pulling in opposite directions, where refugees sit in the middle space struggling to keep some form of normalcy in their lives. It is in this middle space that the role of humanitarian aid comes in.

The role of humanitarian aid in the city is different than the role it plays in camps and other controlled spaces. The role of aid in the city can become the bridge that pulls the forces of the city as a space and territory closer to each other. However, the struggle is that aid organizations are not familiar with operation in the urban setting. As we saw earlier, humanitarian aid operates under the crisis narrative, which is reactive and is based on short-term and temporary solutions. For dealing with Urbanization in Motion however, the go-to mechanisms if humanitarian aid does not fulfill the needs of the people displaced. In the city, the needs of the refugees and migrants go beyond the immediate basic services; the need is inclusion and having the ability to speak the "street language" of the communities they live with. This cannot be achieved without working with both the local and displaced communities and without engaging with the people and initiatives that are already working on a small scale to pull the forces of the city as space and territory closer to each other. This is why I propose a new urban lens through which aid organizations and government agencies can look at the challenges that come with Urbanization in Motion.

Malta Market




FOCUS ON SYRIA

So far, we have established three main points that act as the backbone for the following proposal based on the concept of Urbanization in Motion. The first point is that even though the forces of displacement may differ, people on the move seek similar outcomes that revolve around inclusion and participation in existing systems. Second, the current crisis narrative is not effective when applied to urban settings, which are dynamic, flexible and complex. Third, the city as a destination presents a paradox where the city as space and the city as a territory are pulling in opposite directions.

This process of Urbanization in Motion is only expected to increase as the impact of climate change affect more people globally. As people flee their farmlands towns and cities due to climate change and other related events, people will seek new places for the continuity of their lives. The core of this project is not to find ways to stop this process through design, policy, or development projects; rather it is to imagine and design processes for cities to be able to absorb Urbanization in Motion.

Urbanization in Motion is occurring as we speak in different places across the world, but these days it is mostly evident in the recent and ongoing conflict in Syria. The conflict has displaced millions of people internally and pushed others into cities in neighboring countries. Focusing on this crisis, the project explores how the process of Urbanization in Motion is manifesting in Istanbul, one of Syria's major neighboring cities currently hosting over 350,000 Syrian refugees. Based on fieldwork and analytical research, the project applies the urban lens to challenges identified in Istanbul in order to demonstrate a framework that brings forth spaces for productive collaborations and partnerships with multiple stakeholders



WHY ISTANBUL?

There are at least 2.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey today, 70% of whom live in urban setting.¹ Currently, Istanbul is hosting an estimated number 350,000 Syrians within its 39 municipal districts.² Despite the large number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the Turkish government has not granted them a refugee status. Instead, it recognizes them as “guests,” a legally vague category unique to Turkey. As mentioned in the previous chapter, technically, this category is inline with the international refugee agreement, since it provides “unobstructed admission of Syrian refugees to Turkish territory, no forced returns and the provision of basic needs including shelter, food and medical support.”³ However, this category lacks specificity and remains flexible for future adjustments, which in most cases materializes as obstacles for refugee mobility.

In addition to the above, Turkey makes an excellent case study in comparison to other countries that are hosting refugees for several reasons: First, Turkey has a strategic and unique geographic location functioning as the intersection between the east and west and the Middle East and Europe. This has made the country a transition space both historically and recently. Second, Turkey has a strong economy and infrastructure systems, in addition to being a major political power in the region. This makes its financial, infrastructural and political response to the Syrian

refugee crisis structured and centralized through government agencies,⁴ allowing this research project to take into consideration the role of government agencies in addressing Urbanization in Motion. Third, Turkey has a long history of internal migration from rural to urban especially within the Kurdish community. This means that there are some mechanisms that have already been put into place to serve the Kurdish communities that can also be studied. Finally, the non-refugee status that Syrians have in Turkey can make this case a more flexible study for the assessment of the urban lens on the process of Urbanization in Motion due to forces other than war.

I focused on Istanbul mainly, because the city hosts the largest number of refugees in the country. In Istanbul, I studied the process of Urbanization in Motion through situation analysis research, spatial analysis and deep mapping. My fieldwork research explored three main aspects: social networks, spatial impacts and policy. I conducted this research through multiple semi-structured interviews with Syrian refugees, NGOs and Turkish academics.

1 UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. Turkey. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 2015, from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>
 2 Orhan, O., & Gündoğar, S. (2015). Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. *Orsam*, 195(January), 14-15. Retrieved from www.orsam.org.tr
 3 Refugee Solidarity Network. (n.d.). Retrieved May, 2016, from <http://www.refugeesolidaritynetwork.org/>

4 Orsam Report (2015).

Aksaray



Syrian Restaurant in Aksaray



Support To Life Community Center



BRIEF IMMIGRATION HISTORY IN ISTANBUL

"Istanbul's first wave of urban migration was a workforce that primarily came from rural Anatolia as early as the mid 19th century."¹ Immigrants who came to the city built informal settlements in the city centers and leftover spaces around the city. These settlement called "gecekondu" (meaning "built overnight" in Turkish), were tolerated and recognized by the Turkish government as a low income housing that the state did not have to pay for it. By the 1950s, the population of the city began to increase by the end of the Second World War due to both the influx of the workforce and rural middle-class migration. By that time, the population of Istanbul was less than one million people,² starting a rapid growth in population and built-up space that constitutes till this day.³

Since Istanbul did not invest in housing projects, people built more gecekondu across the city leading to a "heterogeneous and scattered urban fabric."⁴ As the middle-class rural to urban migrants arrived to city, they also took advantage of the lack of building regulations and built was is referred to as the "capitalist Yapsat,"⁵ three to four story buildings that were often built in the middle of the gecekondu and appeared to be out of scale. This has eventually led to large population densities in areas that did not have adequate services.⁶ This type of unregulated and unplanned development of the city led to socio-economic problems in the city.⁷

The construction of the gecekondu was the path to homeownership and economic growth. The process occurred in a collective manner where people had access to land and property through "informal partnerships organized by entrepreneurs who received the ... Thus, the entire illegal process of land occupation and allocation, indeed of construction, contributed to the strengthening of networks."⁸ This informal process created room for social integration and access of the urban poor to rent and home ownership.

In Istanbul, the chaotic development of the city, the lack of building codes and land ownership allowed for the development of an income diverse community that allowed for the integration of the urban poor through property ownership, strong networks and participation in the informal market.

The gecekondu in Istanbul, which were once part of the city center and key for the inclusion of low-income communities, began to transform as their inhabitants were pushed out to the periphery through urban renewal projects in 1980s. The social integration that Istanbul saw in the early 1900s was soon replaced by the effects of globalization on the city, which gained speed with the rise of five-star hotels, gated communities and the branding of the city as a tourist

1 Dossick, C. S., Gualy, N., Merlino, K. R., Twill, J., Fishburn, I., & Dunn, L. (2012). The Conflicted City: Hypergrowth, Urban Renewal and Mass Urbanization in Istanbul. *Runstad Center for Real Estate Studies*, 06-42. Retrieved May, 2016.

2 Dossick, C. S., Gualy, N., Merlino, K. R., Twill, J., Fishburn, I., & Dunn, L. (2012).

3 Parnell, S., Schewenius, M., Sendstad, M., Seto, K. C., & Wilkinson, C. Urbanization, Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services: Challenges and Opportunities.

4 Parnell, S., Schewenius, M., Sendstad, M., Seto, K. C., & Wilkinson, C. Urbanization, Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services: Challenges and Opportunities.

5 Dossick, C. S., Gualy, N., Merlino, K. R., Twill, J., Fishburn, I., & Dunn, L. (2012). The Conflicted City: Hypergrowth, Urban Renewal and Mass Urbanization in Istanbul. *Runstad Center for Real Estate Studies*, 06-42. Retrieved May, 2016.

6 Dossick, C. S., Gualy, N., Merlino, K. R., Twill, J., Fishburn, I., & Dunn, L. (2012).

7 Parnell, S., Schewenius, M., Sendstad, M., Seto, K. C., & Wilkinson, C. Urbanization, Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services: Challenges and Opportunities

8 Keyder, C. (2005). Globalization and social exclusion in Istanbul. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29(1), (124-134). p125

destination.⁹ The labor structure of the city also changed. As the industry sector in Istanbul, which once attracted unskilled workers, left the city centers, the job demand shifted from industrial to services, and with that the urban fabric of the city began to change. This has led the city to shift from being a space of inclusion, driven by the lack of restrictive policies, to become exclusionary through urban policy and development strategies. A process of gentrification, similar to what we see in the American cities, became common in Istanbul, where small business shut down in the city center to be replaced by global brands and high-end stores. The urban poor and gecekondu dwellers paid the price as they were pushed to the city periphery.¹⁰

One of the major impacts on the development of Istanbul since the 1980s until this day is the flow of global capital into the city and the growing image of the city as a cultural and tourist attraction. In 2006, for example Istanbul was selected as "European Capital" for 2010.¹¹ This has led the city to prepare over the span of four years to fulfill this label. The "imaging" and packaging of the city as a tourist destination, became a major force in policy decision-making. The historic parts of the city became a target for these imaging strategies, as the city initiated several "conservation and regeneration initiatives" in these once poor and disadvantaged pockets in order to "create exclusive and distinctive places for tourists, visitors, potential residents and service sector office workers."¹² This was visible to me during my visit to Istanbul early this year in the Tarlabasi neighborhood in city center of Istanbul.

The Tarlabasi neighborhood is located a couple of blocks west of Istiklal street, a long stretch known as the tourist destination packed with international brands, cafes and restaurants. Tarlabasi is the most recent target for urban renewal projects.¹³ It is one of the gecekondu that was once populated by immigrant communities since the early 1900s. Recently, due to the urban renewal projects mentioned above the neighborhood is riddled with construction sites and branding images while diverse community that once lived there is uprooted to make way for new development that is fitting to the global image of the city.¹⁴

The Syrian refugees coming into Istanbul today are not access the city that had a level of informal integration. Instead, they are entering a city that high level of inequality that is being fueled by urban transformation projects. As refugees come into Istanbul, they mainly settle with low-income communities that are already facing systemic marginalization. This is only leading to more fragmentation within the transforming urban fabric of the city.

If the secret to a sustainable and resilient community is through networks, then these projects are doing the opposite. By making way for the imagined tourist attraction, the city is a population that has built roots and networks in the neighborhood with a new one, challenging the process of social resiliency. These urban renewal projects are raising concern "about the challenges and conflicts they

9 Keyder, C. (2005). Globalization and social exclusion in Istanbul. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29(1), (124-134). p.128

10 Keyder, C. (2005). Globalization and social exclusion in Istanbul. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29(1), (124-134). p.132

11 Ercan, M. A. (2011). Challenges and conflicts in achieving sustainable communities in historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul. *Habitat International*, 35(2), (295-306). p.295

12 Ellen, I. G., & O'Regan, K. (2012). Gentrification: Perspectives of economists and planners. *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Economics and Planning*, 371-391.

13 Ivanoff, A. (2013, April 29). Istanbul's Tarlabasi – a symbol of urban renewal. Retrieved May, 2016, from http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/columns/article/istanbuls-tarlabasi-a-symbol-of-urban-renewal_13241

14 Ellen, I. G., & O'Regan, K. (2012). Gentrification: Perspectives of economists and planners. *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Economics and Planning*, 371-391.

faced against the development of sustainable communities.¹⁵ By these market-driven policies and projects, communities are being fragmented according to income and the communities that once had access to parts of the city, no longer have it. Together with the neo-liberal policies, the legislations of urban transformation that were enacted consecutively over the last three decades have not only given the way of developing fragmented and piecemeal projects in both inner city and peripheral areas, strengthening gentrification, social segregation and exclusion, but they also have led to displace the poor and vulnerable communities of their localities, without having had their problems addressed.”¹⁶

“If social integration depends on the existence of networks, the new migrants are not in a fortunate situation in terms of being able to tap into existing links in order to generate networks to be used toward employment or housing. The new immigrants are socially excluded: unlike the older immigrants who could assure socio-economic integration through the mobilization of network relations, they lack the material resources and the social capital necessary for any integration.”¹⁷

15 Ercan, M. A. (2011). Challenges and conflicts in achieving sustainable communities in historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul. *Habitat International*, 35(2), (295-306). p.295

16 Ercan, M. A. (2011). p.296

17 Keyder, C. (2005). Globalization and social exclusion in Istanbul. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29(1), (124-134). p.132



KEY FINDINGS

Syrian Refugee Population Density in Istanbul by City 2013

My work through this project addresses a fraction of the questions that are related to the process of Urbanization in Motion. However, it aims to paint a picture of what this process entails. My interest is twofold, one is in the global forces that instigate this process, while the other is the simple question of what happens when people make it to the city, taking Istanbul as an example. This is repeated in Lebanese, Jordanian, Turkish, Greek and other European cities today.

On the Global level, Urbanization in Motion goes against the predominant notion of rural-to-urban migration, associated with the Industrial Age, but at the same time, is a continuation of it. This new process of mobility is one that does not entirely fall under the conventional migration theory, even though its destination is also the city. The key difference in this process is that it is rooted in, caused by, and occurs during moments of upheaval, crisis and despair. It takes place when that conditions that sustain life, abruptly and almost entirely cease to exist, leading large numbers of people to leave their countries, cities or towns in search of spaces where their livelihoods will not be uprooted again. This form of urbanization is associated with humanitarian disasters that involved loss of life and property. However, I consider it a continuation of the rural-to-urban urbanization, based on the understanding the climate change related events will become the new norm for human existence and will be the main cause for mass displacement and migration in the near future.

As for the city scale, I tried to unpack the experience of refugees in the city by focusing on the different types of support networks that are visible and obscure; or in other words formal and insurgent. I defined them as such:

Formal Networks included Turkish, Syrian and international NGOs. After further research, I was able to make distinctions between the groups that have been present before the Syrian refugees (which mainly served other immigrant communities including Kurds), and other NGOs that were specifically created to address the Syrian presence in Istanbul. The later groups are mainly Syrian NGOs based in Istanbul and Turkey.

The Insurgent Networks included solidarity networks, grassroots organizations and private sector initiative. These are not politically or religiously affiliated and have been initiated either by Syrians or Turks or by collaboration between both. I refer to this network as insurgent because it is embedded within the urban sphere. The groups that belong to this network are not officially funded or supported, and some of them are privately owned. I was able to connect with individuals who provided a form of assistance on small scale and on the level of the city. These individuals vary between being community leaders, business owners or professionals.


As you may have noticed, I included the private sector as part of the insurgent networks. Here, I am not referring to major donors or large-scale investors. As you see above, I am referring to people who own business, have started community centers or provide support through their business structure. The private sector plays a major role in Istanbul within the Syrian community: many Syrians who arrived to Istanbul with some financial capital were able to start businesses in different areas in the city. The case of Syrian investment ventures is unique to Turkey because the government allows Syrians to obtain an investor's visa at an affordable price as long as they have a Turkish partner. The private businesses also function as a solidarity networks that supports the Syrian community both socially, but providing networks of fellow Syrians, and financially by providing jobs to the Syrian communities.

Another aspect of my research focused on the physical features of the urban space. Here, I looked at how new communities and social networks impacted the physical space of the city, the role of public transit in the location of these networks and role of public space. For this aspect, I focused on the Fatih area in the city center of Istanbul since it has the most concentration of Syrian refugees and businesses. This portion of the research was essential in understanding how the process of Urbanization in Motion manifests on the ground. I was also able to connect with several Syrian refugees and business owners. The main findings of this section of my research are the importance of the social networks in the lives of the refugees in city. Contrary to what I was expecting, the location of public transit was not essential for the Syrian refugees as they settled in the city. What affected their locations were two main and, arguably obvious points,



ORSAM Data 2013
Map Generated With Cartodb By Nadine Rachid

ORSAM Data 2014



Syrian Refugee Population Density in Istanbul by City 2013

the first is affordability, second is the location of other Syrian communities, as mentioned in the previous chapter, this also varied depending on level conservativeness. As for access to jobs, people seemed to work in the neighborhoods that they lived in. At the time of research, refugees did not have access to job permits and therefore were mainly working in the informal sector or illegally. This might change as the work permit law gets implemented.

Finally, I looked at the different policies that were put into place, how these policies served the Syrian and Turkish communities. I also researched other needs that have not been addressed by policies. As a million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea in a quest for European cities, there was a political pressure on Turkey to place stronger restrictions on the refugees. This was imposed by multinational agreements and funding assistance to the Turkish government. I expanded on the restrictive aspects of some of these policies in the previous chapter, however, one of the positive policies was that since January, is the issuance of work permits that allowed Syrians to work in Turkey as long as they do not constitute more than 10% of the workforce within one organization. However, this policy has not been effective so far, since most Syrians work in the informal sector making it more lucrative for both the workers and employees.

This crisis narrative is the essence of my argument, which led me to this question:

Since the future of our planet is loaded with moments of crisis that involve, or will lead to mass local and cross-border mobility in the form of Urbanization in Motion, and since these events fall under the crisis narrative, what will the future of our cities look like?

A more productive question is: how can cities begin to prepare for events of mass local and cross-border mobility caused by a blend of man-made disasters directly and indirectly affecting the lives and livelihoods of millions?

I will not claim that I have an answer to these questions. However, I believe that we are at a time in history where global events should not be taken lightly or look at as isolated events. The refugee crisis, should not be only the focus of humanitarian aid organizations and the countries that are immediately affected by it, it should be the focus of policy makers, researchers, planners, government agencies and even citizens worldwide. This crisis is not a only a tragic humanitarian one, it represents a small peek into the future of cities under climate change, making it an urgent urban development and sustainability challenge.


Here, I propose a shift from the crisis management lens to the Urban Lens when addressing issues of forced displacement into cities.

What is the Urban Lens?

Humanitarian
Aid
Approaches

Impacts Of
Policy
Amendments

Spacial
Analysis



UNHCR Data
Map Generated With Cartodb By Nadine Rachid

AN URBAN LENS

THE URBAN LENS

The Urban Lens is a research and investigative process that presents aid organizations and government agencies with an alternative lens to approach the urban challenges that accompany the process of Urbanization in Motion. This lens, specific to the urban context, does not aim to provide “solutions” for “problems;” rather, it reframes the context around these urban challenges in order to open up opportunities for collaborations and partnerships with organization, agencies and interests involved in this complex process. Ultimately, this urban lens will shift the discourse around Urbanization in Motion from being limited to temporary and reactive crisis narratives, to become an urban narrative: dynamic, flexible and resilient: rooted in rebuilding communities and supporting existing and emerging social entities in the city as a whole.

This proposal targets the humanitarian aid organizations as actors that sit strategically in the meso space of social organization, where they have access to government agencies and the international community on one hand, and to the refugee, displaced and host communities on the ground. The Urban Lens is a process that is designed specifically for crisis situations within urban settings for aid organizations and government agencies. The result is a new way of situating the challenges associated with the Urbanization in Motion and the actors that are involved in specific space and time.

With the Syrian refugee crisis, the conversation within the humanitarian aid community has started to show small signs of shifting from only focusing on the refugee camps to stressing on the urgency around forced displacement as it pertains to the urban context. Organizations like the International Rescue Committee (IRC) have started a department that is dedicated to researching and learning about the practices that are taking place in the urban context.¹ The CEO and president of the organizations have been calling for more attention to the urban context as it relates to forced displacement, on social media and during conferences since last year.² Also, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) has recently published a report about the challenges of delivering aid within the urban sphere. Aid organizations are well aware of the importance of giving attention to action within the urban context. However, the challenge remains on how this action will take place.

The value that the Urban Lens brings to the aid organizations is that it situates this process of displacement-to-cities as an urbanization challenge. It removes it from being limited to aid approaches and places it in the conversation about cities and development. Also, the Urban Lens provides a research process that engages with all actors in the field and identifies the missing

.....
1 “The nexus between urbanization, violence and conflict: Linking SDG 11 and SDG 16.” Graduate Program in Urban Design, The City College of New York - CUNY, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), UN-HABITAT, UNDP, the Permanent Missions of Norway and Lebanon to the United Nations
2 Miliband, D. (2015, October 30). David Miliband | Cities are where the Syrian refugee crisis is at its worst. Retrieved May, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/oct/30/cities-are-at-the-centre-of-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-so-why-are-they-being-ignored>

links between them. Therefore, as aid organizations are calling for cross-discipline collaborations, the Urban Lens provides a framework that identifies “insurgent” actors that are also involved with, and are providing support to people dealing with the process of Urbanization in Motion. This process brings to the foreground the role of the refugees themselves in finding ways to overcome the challenges they face and the support networks that are embedded within the urban fabric. The purpose is to be able to identify productive spaces for aid organizations to build networks and support existing initiatives.

The process does not target the structural makeup of a single organization. However, it is situated in the space in between aid organizations among themselves, government agencies, grassroots organizations and the communities they aim to serve. This process is designed for aid organizations, however can be adopted by government agencies as well.

The Urban Lens is based on the concept of the city as a space for coexistence, co-habitation and co-production. Therefore, the city here is not the physical urban sphere, rather the networks of social, economic, environmental and political systems. By looking at the city as a “social ecological system” (SES), we think of it as “an integrated system of ecosystems and human societies with reciprocal feedback and interdependence.”³ Similarly, by applying resilience thinking to the Urban Lens, we move away from finding solutions towards finding a sequence of actions that inform and learn from each other. Resilience thinking brings with it the notions of adaptability to integrate internal and external processes, transformability which allows for innovation through learning from combinations of experiences, and resilience that allows for the absorbance of changes as they occur.⁴ These characteristics make the Urban Lens flexible and fitting for the urban context as a social ecological system.

The Urban Lens is made up of three main actions: Investigate, Identify and reframe. The combination of these actions provide an in depth framework for a contextual analysis, a deep understanding of the actors involved on multiple scales and across disciplines, and provides a set of values that guide the process of decision making. The result of the Urban Lens is the discovery of spaces for collaborations with non-traditional actors that makes obscure actors visible and built a web of support networks that is made of multiple small networks. Aid organizations are meant to take the lead on building this network through applying this process:

.....
3 Folke, C., S. R. Carpenter, B. Walker, M. Scheffer, T. Chapin, and J. Rockström. 2010. Resilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability and transformability. *Ecology and Society* 15(4): 20. [online] URL: <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art20/>
4 Folke, C., S. R. Carpenter, B. Walker, M. Scheffer, T. Chapin, and J. Rockström. 2010. Resilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability and transformability. *Ecology and Society* 15(4): 20. [online] URL: <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art20/>

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
INVESTIGATE

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
IDENTIFY

VALUES
RE-FRAME

A QUEST FOR CONNECTIONS & NETWORKS WITHIN SYSTEMS
URBANIZATION IN MOTION

NEW APPROACHES SHOULD

- Build on existing networks
- Provide support to the community as whole
- Build social resiliency
- Be long-term approaches
- Work across scales & sectors

- CONNECTING COMMUNITY, NEIGHBORHOOD, STATE, NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL
- THINKING BEYOND AID
- EXPOSING INSURGENT URBAN ACTORS
- EXPOSING SPACES FOR COLLABORATION
- CONNECTING AN INSURGENT URBAN SYSTEM

APPROACH


- NEW CRITERIA
- INTEGRATION BETWEEN SYSTEMS
 - WORK ACROSS SCALES
 - ENGAGE WITH UNTRADITIONAL ACTORS

ACTIVELY BEING A CITY

- COEXISTENCE
- CO-PRODUCTION
- COHABITATION

SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM

- ADAPTABILITY
- TRANS FORMABILITY
- RESILIENCE



URBAN LENS

1951 Refugee Convention

Adopted with "Geographic Limitations"

Turkey assumes responsibility for resettlement & inclusion of refugees from **Council of Europe**.
Refugees from **all Other Countries** will be granted Temporary Asylum & must find **alternative long-term solutions**

2011 WAR IN SYRIA

2013 **Law of Foreigners & International Protection** Drafted

2014 **Implemented**

The law addresses Migration Management through reforms on migration policy, oversight, work and residency permits and asylum policy.
Refugees are considered **GUESTS** and are allowed to live outside of camps.
If applying for third country asylum, refugees will be placed in camps outside of major cities.

FAULTY IMPLEMENTATION :

- Lack of qualified personnel to
- Unlawful deportation
- Bureaucratic & judicial
- Reported cases of "Torture & ill-treatment in security level."
- Social discrimination, prejudice and stigmatization.

FREE KIMLIK
Identity Card →

FREE HEALTH CARE EDUCATION

EU / TURKEY DEAL Negotiations late 2015

Turkey to limit smuggling of refugees to Europe

EU / TURKEY DEAL SIGNED 2016

JANUARY 2106: TURKEY ISSUES WORK PERMITS
Multiple Limitations

NEW VISA REGULATIONS FOR SYRIANS

NEW KIMLIK REGULATIONS LIMIT MOBILITY BETWEEN CITIES

MORE REGULATIONS ON REFUGEE MOBILITY

FORCE

Through my fieldwork in Istanbul, I was able to identify several actors that can be considered insurgent actors and that provide support to Syrian community in one way or another:

- Hamisch is a not-for-profit Syrian cultural center in Istanbul that is founded through collaboration between Syrians living in the city and Turkish citizen. The center works on changing the image of the refugee as "victim" and offers space for refugees to reclaim their political identity, through conversations and cultural participation.
- Pages Bookstore and Café is the first Arabic bookstore in Istanbul. The owner a Syrian refugee himself found an opportunity to provide books in the Arabic language for many Syrians who live in the city. Even though this is a privately owned business, the bookstore holds Arabic music evening for free. During these events, the small space is at times unable to accommodate all guests. The store also holds workshops for children, Turkish and Syrians.
- AD.DAR is a privately owned community and cultural center. The center is mainly aimed for Syrian and Palestinian Syrian refugees living in Istanbul and establish by a Palestinian Syrian refugee. It offers weekend workshops for children, Turkish classes, including sections for women only.
- Arthere is an art gallery owned by Syrian artists who moved to Istanbul when the war started. The gallery also functions as a coffee shop that provides profit to the artists. The gallery hosts cultural events that bring Syrians and Turks together.
- Salt is a Turkish gallery, museum and research space. The gallery collaborates with Syrian artists, thus bring both Turkish and Syrian communities under one roof.

In addition to the above private and not for profit organization, I met and/or was told about a few individuals who were working on providing assistance to refugee communities in Istanbul:

- Ozge Acikkol is a Turkish artist that works with both Syrian refugees and Turkish communities.
- Ali is a Syrian imam who works in a local Turkish mosque in the Fatih area. Ali provides assistance from the mosque to his Syrian community. Syrians and Turks alike frequent the mosque.
- Asala is a Syrian pharmacist who works in a Turkish pharmacy also in the Fatih area. Asala is an asset to her boss because she attracts Arabic speaking customers. However, she is also an asset to her community because she is connected almost 100 Arabic speaking doctors in Istanbul.
- Syrian business owners know each other. They also tend to start businesses in clusters next to each other. They are assets to their community because they hire other Syrians and they are connected to multiple networks in the city.

This process also includes investigating which anchor institutions and urban assets are actively involved in the process of Urbanization in Motion within the urban sphere. Below is a list of a few anchor institutions I came across during my research:


- The mosque where Imam Ali works
- Several Syrians schools that have been established across the city; one of them was established by the

Syrian Nur Association for Relief, a Syrian Turkish faith based relief organization that works across the country and in Syria.

- Syrian health clinics. Also, one of them established by the Nur Associations.
- Mosques and other religious institutions.
- All Turkish schools and hospitals since they must admit Syrian refugees.
- Community centers that have been established by aid organizations across the city. At the time of research, there were only five of these centers.
- Public parks

After getting a well-rounded understanding on who is doing what in the city, the next step in this section is identifying the challenges that need to be addressed. This can be done through a traditional needs assessment process. However, the difference here is that the organization needs to aggregate the information in table that shows how each institution, organization and insurgent actor is addressing each challenge. This will lead to a matrix of multiple actors and understanding of the situation of multiple scales.

The purpose of the investigation process is to identify multiple networks in both the Syrian and Turkish community. This does not mean that we need to connect with all the people involved in the process however, it means that we are able to know who the assets are in each community and what services they provide. This step is the most important of the three since it sets the stage for the next two steps. The process involves both background and ethnographic research, in addition to mapping and interviewing. I call this step "investigation," since it is in fact a process of hunting for and following leads, making phone calls and conducting interviews.



SOCIAL ORGANIZATION **IDENTIFY**

IDENTIFY THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED:
MAP CONNECTIONS & NETWORKS WITHIN & ACROSS
SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY:

- 1) COMMONALITIES & DIFFERENCES
- 3) POWER DYNAMICS ACROSS SYSTEMS
- 2) MISSING CONNECTIONS

MATRIX - SYSTEMS DIAGRAMMING

One of the first things I noticed through my research is that the aid organizations work in silos, as mentioned earlier in the Crisis Approach section. This means that aid organizations do not fully coordinate on the services they provide. Although this proposal does not address this operational fragmentation within the aid world, it requires from the organization applying this process to identify the type of connections and relations that exist between the aid organizations among each other, the government agencies, local initiatives and insurgent networks that were identified through the investigation process.

After the investigation process is complete, the next step is the identification process. This step involves establishing a power relation mapping diagram that visualizes the relation that the actors and assets have between each other. This occurs through a power mapping that places all the actors and assets in social organizational chart. This includes both social and physical assets in the city.

The social organization chart can materialize in any form that the organization finds helpful for their operations. There are some online paid programs that help in visualizing these network and that are secure to use. Or, organizations can contract digital designers and engineers to develop a tool for their use. The important part of this step is how these networks are relations are visuals in order to reflect the power dynamics and type of connection. The social organizational chart is perfect for this purpose as it is able to reflect how these organizations; institutions and insurgent actors sit in the different scales of the city. The chart is divided into three scales:¹

Macro: "The Macro level is the largest of the society groupings ... the macro level looks at how the institutions within a large population affect the masses. Things like the economy, government structure, religion and more are all their own smaller groupings but together they form the boundaries of the macro level society. These institutions are interrelated and tend to be closely linked in their values giving off an overall feel of the culture that the society sprang from ... Problems at this larger level tend to have a trickle down effect into the smaller scaled level of societies making it that much more important to address the problems here as soon as they're found. From the macro level the internal structure of a society can begin to be rearranged to meet the needs of the growing, changing population."

Government institution on multiple scales of international, national, regional or local, legislative bodies and multilateral organizations are placed on this scale. This includes all the assistance programs that government agencies have put into place such as small business assistance, vocational training and poverty reduction programs.

Meso: The "Meso level is the lesser known of the society groupings as they aren't dealing with huge societies of the macro level that affect many or the intriguing smaller, micro levels that deals

¹ Applying Sociology Within Various Society Levels. (n.d.). Retrieved May 08, 2016, from <http://www.appliedsoc.org/society/>

One of the first things I noticed through my research is that the aid organizations work in silos, as mentioned earlier in the Crisis Approach section. This means that aid organizations do not fully coordinate on the services they provide. Although this proposal does not address this operational fragmentation within the aid world, it requires from the organization applying this process to identify the type of connections and relations that exist between the aid organizations among each other, the government agencies, local initiatives and insurgent networks that were identified through the investigation process.

After the investigation process is complete, the next step is the identification process. This step involves establishing a power relation mapping diagram that visualizes the relation that the actors and assets have between each other. This occurs through a power mapping that places all the actors and assets in social organizational chart. This includes both social and physical assets in the city.

The social organization chart can materialize in any form that the organization finds helpful for their operations. There are some online paid programs that help in visualizing these network and that are secure to use. Or, organizations can contract digital designers and engineers to develop a tool for their use. The important part of this step is how these networks are relations are visuals in order to reflect the power dynamics and type of connection. The social organizational chart is perfect for this purpose as it is able to reflect how these organizations; institutions and insurgent actors sit in the different scales of the city. The chart is divided into three scales:¹

Macro: "The Macro level is the largest of the society groupings ... the macro level looks at how the institutions within a large population affect the masses. Things like the economy, government structure, religion and more are all their own smaller groupings but together they form the boundaries of the macro level society. These institutions are interrelated and tend to be closely linked in their values giving off an overall feel of the culture that the society sprang from ... Problems at this larger level tend to have a trickle down effect into the smaller scaled level of societies making it that much more important to address the problems here as soon as they're found. From the macro level the internal structure of a society can begin to be rearranged to meet the needs of the growing, changing population."

Government institution on multiple scales of international, national, regional or local, legislative bodies and multilateral organizations are placed on this scale. This includes all the assistance programs that government agencies have put into place such as small business assistance, vocational training and poverty reduction programs.

Meso: The "Meso level is the lesser known of the society groupings as they aren't dealing with huge societies of the macro level that affect many or the intriguing smaller, micro levels that deals with day to day human interaction. The Meso level is the middle ground the organizations that are on a mid scale ... These Meso societies include institutions such as jail as well, smaller systems of people with a different set of guidelines for societal organization."

This scale includes international and local aid organizations, local implementing partners for larger multilateral organizations and anchor institutions such as religious institutions, schools, hospitals and community centers. One can think of the Meso level as the space the links the Macro scale to the Micro.

Micro: "The micro level deals with the daily actions and interactions of people in society. It examines the social roles that we take on within society as well as how we react to society and understand it ... Micro level study of society hones in on the smallest elements that create the idea of what a society is, the norms and behaviors that make it recognizable as a its own society. Ritual, socialization, segregation of activities and sanctions are all indicators as to how one should interact within a society. They are the guidelines that mentally tip us off as to the type of micro level society we are in."


The micro scale includes small local initiatives, grassroots organizations, individual initiatives and the private sector. Actors on this scale are not connected, affiliated or directly supported by larger institutions or organizations.

¹ Applying Sociology Within Various Society Levels. (n.d.). Retrieved May 08, 2016, from <http://www.appliedsoc.org/society/>


These scales are more of gradients rather than fixed boundaries, therefore, as one places the different organizations, institutions and actors on the chart, he or she should be also aware of each actor's position with each scale. For example, advocacy institutions, policy makers, think tanks and research organizations sit between the Macro and Meso levels since they do not directly interact with the Micro scale although they serve it. Anchor institutions such as schools, healthcare facilities and religious institutions sit closer to the Micro level since they directly interact with the local communities and individuals.

After establishing where each actor fits on the social organization chart, the aim is to identify how these actors are related to each other and types of connections they have across scales and sectors. This means setting standards to the types of relations: direct, indirect, top-down, allows access, has political power over, limited collaboration and/or limited to observation. The aim here is to visualize the existing links and the missing ones in order to identify spaces for potential collaborations and partnerships. The purpose of this step is not connect all the actors together, however, it is to be able to identify specific points of entry or nodes. For example, while applying this mapping process to my research, I was able to identify the insurgent actors as the only network that has access to both the Turkish and Syrian communities alike, without a top-down hierarchical approach.

NETWORK DIAGRAMMING: This is a process to identify how these actors are related to each other and types of connection they have across scales & sectors. The purposed is to specific points of entry or nodes for collaborations & partnerships



CRISIS NARRATIVE




Refugee Community Conservative Low-income Secular Artists / Academics Activist General	Local Community Conservative Low-income Secular Artists / Academics Activist General	One-way Direct One-way Limited Two-way Limited Collaboration Two-way Direct Collaboration Pressure	Insurgent Relation Observation Access Limited Access Direct Advocacy	Faith-Based Organization Anchor Institution Turkish Actor Syrian Actor	Government Agency Research Group International Organization
---	---	--	--	---	---

URBAN LENS

EDUCATION:
 Child Labor
 Access to Public Schools
 Access to Syrian Schools
 Unrecognized Syrian Degrees

ECONOMIC GROWTH



Refugee Community Conservative Low-income Secular Artists / Academics Activist General	Local Community Conservative Low-income Secular Artists / Academics Activist General	One-way Direct	Insurgent Relation	Faith-Based Organization	Government Agency
		One-way Limited	Observation	Anchor Institution	Research Group
		Two-way Limited Collaboration	Access Limited	Turkish Actor	International Organization
		Two-way Direct Collaboration	Access Direct	Syrian Actor	
		Pressure	Advocacy		

IN BRIEF

The concept of Urbanization in Motion tells us that what we are looking at today in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis is not only a refugee story. It is a story about societies on the move in search for systems and infrastructure as anchors in order for them to find a space, both physical and virtual, for the continuity of their lives. Societies on the move include the movement of cultures, social networks and assets, skills, languages but also new sets of challenges. This process does not mean that people who moved to new cities under dire conditions of environmental, economic or political upheaval will stay in one space forever. The duration of people's stay in a specific neighborhood, city or country is dependent on the policies each territory presents. However, this action of staying in the urban sphere, regardless of its duration remains a process of urbanization that impacts the physical, social and economic fabric in the city.

In early 2012, Syrian refugees started coming to Beirut. By the beginning of the summer of that year, landlords leased their building rooftops for multiple families to live in makeshift shelters, roundabouts and the leftover spaces under bridges were sporadically populated by refugees escaping Syria overnight, and even parking lots were renting out parking spots by the night for refugees in desperate need for any form of shelter.¹ At the time, I was living in Beirut. As the days went by I saw Beirut, a city at most times challenging for its own citizens, hastily adapting to a large population increase. Today, one out of four people in Lebanon are a Syrian refugee.²

I started this project thinking that I will focus on the case of Syrian urban refugees. I decided to focus on Istanbul since it was less complicated, politically, socially and economically, than other cities hosting refugees, such as Beirut, a city that deals with sectarian and political divisions and a constantly failing infrastructure, or Amman, a city that is deeply divided by inequality and is already hosting thousands of Palestinian refugees. However, my project led me in directions that I was not expecting. Through my research over the last nine months, I was able to uncover a process of urbanization that is unique to our current time as it is linked to the challenge of climate change, and the impacts that climate change will have on the future of cities.

Urbanization in Motion became the term I used to refer to the process of urbanization that combines the tragic events that force people out of their homes, cities and countries, with the movement of people into urban areas. Simply by recognizing this movement of people as urbanization rather than temporary displacement, we are able to see it under a different light that does not only focus on the humanitarian aspect of this process but also on its impacts on the development of cities. This realization places the current refugee crisis and other forced displacement processes that are taking place across the world as we speak, in the space of sustainable development, and urges the international community, aid organizations, government agencies and policymakers to rethink how the Sustainable Development Goals that have been agreed to less than a year ago, can be implemented and achieved on a local scale.

Through revealing this process I was faced with many more questions what I began with. This project could have gone in multiple directions to address an array of thematic, practices and theories. However, I remained interested in the role of the city in this process. Although I was not able to go into more depth in the concepts of access to the city or the problematique that comes with notion of the city as a refuge, I was successful in bringing the conversion of forced displacement closer to that of the future of sustainable

1 D. S. (2015). Syria's Good Neighbors. Retrieved May 2, 2016, from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/jordan/2015-09-28/syrias-good-neighbors>

2 Madi, M., McKenzie, S., & Longman, J. (2015, December 22). Lebanon One in Four a Refugee [Video]. Lebanon: BBC News.

cities. I was also interested in breaking out of the predefined categories of displacement, and rather focus on the city as a destination, fully acknowledging and taking into consideration that the experiences of people in the city are highly dependent on their legal and socioeconomic status.

Many questions remain unanswered; from a migration studies perspective one might ask questions as such: how does this urbanization process materialize in other places where it occurs as the anchor points differ between communities? Will it follow a melting-pot narrative or a counter-melting-pot one?

From a social justice perspective one might ask about the future of equity in the time of Urbanization in Motions: who has access to services and at what level? How can we include the voices of the underrepresented communities in the conversations? How does the concept of the "right to the city" play out in the cities dealing with Urbanization in Motion?

As for the policy perspective, some questions revolve around the future of border policies in a time where mobility is accepted as an informal adaptation strategy to climate change. Will we see more fortified countries (physically and through restrictive policies) and what does the future of relation between the global south and the global north as countries redefine their border policies? From an urbanist perspective, I ask: How can we plan cities that are able to absorb these patterns of Urbanization in Motion? And, how can we learn from places that are dealing with Urbanization in Motion to prepare cities for future events that involve mass displacement and movement of people?



The aim of the Urban Lens is to provide a strategy that begins to unpack the complexity of the city that is entangled with the complexity of the challenges introduced and/or amplified by the arrival of the a new population. This lens becomes a tool for deciphering the urban context and identifying potential partners by exposing non-traditional actors and reframing the challenges under the urbanization narrative, instead of the crisis one. Ultimately, the Urban Lens aims to shift the discourse around forced displacement away from the crisis management approach, rather to include it in the current conversation at the international community level regarding the future of cities, whether through the Sustainable Development Goals, the Habitat III conference or future conferences and agreements to come.

The success of the Urban Lens looks like this: key organization that sit in the meso space of the city and are connected to the macro organizations and agencies, become connected to specific active nodes on micro scale. These nodes are represented by insurgent actors who have access to the communities on the ground and are able to communicate, support and reflect the wants and needs of their communities. As for the meso organizations, they become the spaces the channel and advocate for these wants and needs to the agencies that can address them.

This is not a new concept in any way. Some organizations already work in this manner. However, the value that the Urban Lens brings is specific to the narrative around the displaced communities living outside of temporary camps. The Urban Lens switches the conversation from being one about "crisis in the city" to one that is about a "city in crisis."³

Once we begin to transfer the notion of the city as an ecology of political, environmental, social and physical systems that are interconnected with other systems beyond the city's jurisdictional boundaries, into practice on the ground, we will be able to address the ecological challenges that come with this process of Urbanization in Motion in cities such as Istanbul, Beirut, Amman, Dhaka and many others.

In his book *For the City yet to Come*, AbdouMaliq Simone refers to "relational webs" that "are pieced together with different cultural strands and references [that allow people to become] conversant with sites, institutions and transactions at different scales – in other words, a capacity to know what to do in order to gain access to various kinds of instrumental resources."⁴

The Urban Lens in only one attempt to unpack this complexity based on the understanding of the city as an ecology and a "relational web." We need many more strategies such as this to come.

3 Earle, L. (n.d.). *Urban Crises and the New Urban Agenda* (p. 3, Working paper). Environment & Urbanization - International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

4 Simone, A. M. (2004). *For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities*. Durham: Duke University Press. p.7





